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Abstract. This paper is devoted to the design and analysis of short undeniable signatures based
on a random oracle. Exploiting their online property, we can achieve signatures with a fully
scalable size depending on the security level. To this end, we develop a general framework based
on the interpolation of group homomorphisms, leading to the design of a generic undeniable
signature scheme called MOVA with batch verication and featuring non-transferability. By
selecting group homomorphisms with a small group range, we obtain very short signatures. We
also minimize the number of moves of the verication protocols by proposing some variants with
only 2 moves in the random oracle model. We provide a formal security analysis of MOVA and
assess the security in terms of the signature length. Under reasonable assumptions and with
some carefully selected parameters, the MOVA scheme makes it possible to consider signatures
of about 50 bits.
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Interactive proofs.
1 Introduction
An undeniable signature scheme is similar to a classical digital signature except that the
recipient of a message cannot verify its validity alone: he needs to interact with the signer
in order to be convinced of the validity or invalidity of the signature. This property, called
invisibility, opposes to the universal veriability of classical digital signatures and allows the
signer to have a control on how his signature spreads. This concept was put forth by Chaum
and van Antwerpen [17] in 1989 and was mainly motivated by the need for privacy of a
signer dealing with private or sensitive contract. Later on, several additional applications
have been proposed such as licensing sensitive software [15], electronic voting [53], and digital
cash [10,16,51]. An undeniable signature scheme is composed of a key generation algorithm,
a signature generation algorithm, a conrmation protocol to prove the validity of a valid
signature, and a denial protocol to prove the invalidity of an invalid signature. It achieves
non-repudiation in the sense that valid signatures can only be forged by the signer and
cannot be denied, but invalid signatures can be denied. Privacy is based on invisibility. It can
be strengthened further by having proofs non-transferable: a malicious verier cannot take
advantage of the interaction with the prover to prove (in)validity of a signature to a third
party.
? This paper builds upon the conference papers [43,45].
Following the seminal article of Chaum and van Antwerpen, a quite fair amount of work
has been dedicated to this eld. In particular, their original scheme gave rise to a series of
articles [9, 15, 18, 20, 34, 39, 40, 46, 47] devoted to schemes based on the discrete logarithm
problem. As alternative of the discrete logarithm, Gennaro et al. [25] proposed an undeniable
signature based on RSA and Biehl et al. [6] devised a scheme based on quadratic orders. The
tremendous development of pairing-based cryptography over the last few years also inuenced
the eld of undeniable signatures as illustrated by the identity-based scheme of Libert and
Quisquater [37], and schemes proposed by Laguillaumie and Vergnaud [35, 36]. Besides, it is
worth to mention papers dealing with other issues such as the transferability of the (in)validity
proof of a signature [21] or blackmailing against the signer [30].
In traditional digital signature schemes, the security collapses when the signature is too
short because of universal veriability: an attacker can try to guess a signature until it is valid
in order to forge it. One advantage of undeniable signatures is that the security smoothly
decreases with the signature length. As an example, we can think of 20-bit signatures which
cannot be forged but with a probability of success of 2 20. The forger can increase it in
an on-line attack, but the number of verication or signing queries can be easily limited. So,
undeniable signatures could in principle be arbitrarily small e.g., as small as a MAC, although
no such signatures were proposed prior to this work.
Our contribution. As far as we know, all previous signature schemes did not fully exploit
the lack of oine verication capability towards the design of schemes oering very short
signatures. One of the main contributions of this work is to remedy to this situation. To
this goal, we develop a general framework based on the sole notion of the interpolation of
group homomorphisms. Based on it, we dene a decisional problem and a computational
problem, which generalizes several fundamental problems related to public-key cryptography.
Among them, we nd the decision and computational Die-Hellman problems as well as the
quadratic residuosity problem. We use this settings to develop a new scheme called MOVA
which is based on a group homomorphism privately known by the signer.
The interest of this technique to undeniable signatures is twofold. First, group homo-
morphisms allow to express the well-known Chaum's undeniable signature [15] and the RSA
undeniable signature of Gennaro et al. [25] in a unied formalism. Secondly, we obtain very
short signatures in a quite natural way, namely by instantiating our MOVA scheme with
group homomorphisms with a range group of small size. In addition to this, we introduce
non-transferability features in our MOVA scheme.
We also propose some 2-move verication protocols for MOVA in the random oracle model.
As far as we know, these are the rst interactive verication protocols achieving only 2
moves. We provide some formal security proofs on the dierent required properties related
to the conrmation and denial protocols such as the soundness, zero-knowledge and non-
transferability. We address invisibility and unforgeability in settings where the attacker has
access to signing, conrmation and denial oracles. This provides precise security bounds and
explain how to select MOVA parameters.
Finally, we oer a batch verication protocol.
Structure of the paper. The next section gives the denition of cryptographic primitives and
the subsequent one is devoted to the security model of undeniable signatures. In Section 4,
we develop the concept of interpolation of group homomorphisms and provide some technical
results which are necessary for the rest of this article. It includes interactive protocols which
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are used in some setup and verication protocols of MOVA. Then, we give a description of
our new scheme called MOVA and prove its security in Section 5. Finally, we provide some
possible instantiations and parameters, discuss additional properties of MOVA, and conclude
this paper.
2 Preliminaries
Notations. A function f(n) is called polynomial and we write f(n) = poly(n) if there exists
an integer k such that f(n) = O(nk). It is called negligible and we write f(n) = negl(n) if for
any integer k we have f(n) = O(n k). For a set S, the notation s 2U S means that we assign
to s an element picked uniformly at random in S. For a probabilistic algorithm A, we denote
by A(x; r) the output produced by A on input x with coins r and by y  A(x) the action
of assigning y to the output of A with input x and random coins as we often omit the coins
from the notation when unnecessary. The statistical distance between two random variables
X1 and X2 with range X is (X1; X2) = 12
P
x2X jPr[X1 = x]   Pr[X2 = x]j. Two random
variables X and Y are computationally resp. statistically resp. perfectly indistinguishable and
we write X c Y resp. X s Y resp. X p Y if no polynomially bounded distinguisher can
tell X and Y apart with non-negligible advantage resp. (X;Y ) is negligible resp. X and Y
have the same probability distribution.
When dealing with Abelian groups, we will use additive notations for group operations.
Proof of membership. A proof protocol Proto is a pair Proto = (P;V) of interactive algorithms
called a prover and a verier. The verier V is assumed to be probabilistic with polynomial
time complexity. The prover P is unbounded. One of the two algorithms is called the initiator
in the protocol.
We recall that an interactive machine is dened by a deterministic algorithm A mapping
an input x, some coins r and a list (possibly empty in the case of the initiator) of input
messages m1; : : : ;mn to a next-message A(x;m1; : : : ;mn; r) = m0. A message ending by a
special termination symbol is called a nal message. The (x; r;m1; : : : ;mn) tuple is called
the partial view of the machine. It is complete if either mn or A(x;m1; : : : ;mn; r) is a nal
message.
An instance of a protocol execution denoted P(w; rP ) x$ V(z; rV ) refers to using x as a
common input, w as a private input for P (this may be called a witness), z as a private input
for V (this may be called an auxiliary input), and rP resp. rV as random coins for P resp.
V.3 For instance, if the verier is the initiator and if mV0 ;mV1 ; : : : resp. mP1 ;mP2 ; : : : are the
messages sent by the verier resp. the prover we have mVi = V(x; z; rV ;mP1 ; : : : ;mPi 1) and
mPi = P(x;w; rP ;mV0 ; : : : ;mVi ) for all i. The complete view of V is denoted
ViewV

P(w; rP ) x$ V(z; rV )

= (x; z; rV ;m
P
1 ; : : : ;m
P
n ):
The output from V, denoted OutputV

P(w; rP ) x$ V(z; rV )

, is the last message from V.
In the random oracle model, algorithms may access to an oracle Gen which implements
a random function with uniform distribution mapping elements of a specied domain to
3 Since P is unbounded we could assume the prover uses no witness nor any random coin without loss of
generality. In practice, however, we use a probabilistic polynomially bounded prover with a witness set up
as some kind of secret key. So we keep it in the notation to avoid confusion.
3
elements of a specied range. For simplicity, we restrict to cases where the domain and the
range are nite sets. Note that an empty domain corresponds to the standard model where
random oracles are not used.
A proof of membership for language L is dened by a set K of pairs (KVp ;KVs ), a mapping
L(x) dening the set of witnesses for a given x 2 L, and a proof protocol (PGen;VGen). The
proof must verify the following properties.
Completeness. For any x 2 L, w 2 L(x), (KVp ;KVs ) 2 K, rP , rV , and any instance of Gen,
we have
OutputV

PGen(w; rP )
x;KVp ! VGen(KVs ; rV )

= accept:
"-Soundness. For any x 62 L, any algorithm P, any (KVp ;KVs ) 2 K, given a random rV and
a random instance Gen, we have
Pr

OutputV

PGen x;K
V
p ! VGen(KVs ; rV )

= accept

 ":
The denition was adapted here to accommodate cases where the verier has a public/private
key pair. The classical denition with auxiliary input is when KVp is void. Later, the secret of
the verier may allow a malicious prover to cheat. For this, we need to replace the notion of
proof by the notion of argument where soundness is replaced by the following property.
"-Computational Soundness. For any x 62 L, any polynomial algorithm P, given some
random (KVp ;KVs ) 2 K, rV , and Gen, we have
Pr

OutputV

PGen x;K
V
p ! VGen(KVs ; rV )

= accept

 ":
That is, the malicious prover is now given some limited time to cheat online given the key of
the verier but still has any time to cheat oine given the instance x.
The proof/argument of membership is zero-knowledge (ZK) if the following property is
satised.
Zero-Knowledge. There exists a probabilistic polynomial time oracle machine B such that
for any x 2 L, any w 2 L(x), and any polynomial time verier V, any auxiliary input z,
and any KVp , given a random rP , rV , rB, and Gen, we have
ViewV

PGen(w; rP )
x;KVp ! VGen(z; rV )

 BV;Gen(x;KVp ; z; rB);
where BV;Gen(x;KVp ; z; rB) denotes the output of B with oracle V and Gen, input x;KVp ; z
and random coins rB. Depending on the type of indistinguishability we have computational
resp. statistical resp. perfect ZK. We further say that the proof is straight-line ZK if
we can construct an online fake prover P with input z who cheats by looking at the
communication tape between V and Gen, i.e. if B consists of simulating the interaction
PGen;tape(z; rP )
x;KVp ! VGen(z; rV ):
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We note that the above denition of zero-knowledge is black-box [27], which means that we
require the existence of one \universal" simulator having an oracle access to the verier.4
In the standard model, Barak et al. [4] proved that zero-knowledge proofs of an NP-
complete language (possibly non-black-box) requires at least 3 moves. To overcome this lim-
itation, the notion of zero-knowledge was extended in the random oracle model (for more
details, see [5]) in which the queries to the random oracles are controlled by the simulator,
i.e., it can simulate the output of the oracles provided that the output distribution is correct.
Pass [50] proposed the notion of deniable zero-knowledge in which the simulator is no longer
allowed to simulate the output of the random oracles, but is only able to observe the queries
made to the random oracles as well as the corresponding answers. This restriction makes the
simulator to produce views which do not yield evidence that the interactive proof occurred.
The above denition follows this model. Pass [50] showed that 2 moves are necessary and
sucient to achieve deniable zero-knowledge for NP. Our interactive zero-knowledge proofs
(with 2 moves) involving random oracles will be deniable. Deniability is indeed crucial to
preserve invisibility in undeniable signatures.
The argument of membership is non-transferable (NT) if the following property is satised.
Non-Transferability. There exists a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm P such that
for any x 2 L, any (KVp ;KVs ) 2 K, any verier V given a random rP , rV , and Gen, we
have
ViewV

PGen(w; rP )
x;KVp ! VGen(KVs ; rV )

 ViewV

PGen(KVs ; rP )
x;KVp ! VGen(KVs ; rV )

Depending on the type of indistinguishability we have computational resp. statistical resp.
perfect NT.
Clearly, the value KVs allows a malicious prover to cheat with a verier with public key KVp
in polynomial time. Thus, we cannot achieve regular soundness.
We note that the denition of non-transferability allows to avoid some attacks in which the
verier V identied with KVp interact with the honest signer and a hidden malicious verier
~V so that ~V gets a proof that x 2 L. Namely, our denition ensures that V with knowledge
of KVs could simulate the messages sent by S (without any help from S) in a straight-line
way. Indeed, if we restrict to malicious veriers knowing KVs , the protocol is straight-line ZK
in a standard-model sense since P does not cheat by looking at the interaction tape between
V and the random oracle.
Our denition of non-transferability is similar to the one of Camenisch and Michels [14]
with the main dierence that our version assumes that V is computationally unbounded.
We can thus assume without loss of generality that V makes no queries to the signing
and conrmation/denial oracles when considering undeniable signatures. Therefore, the non-
transferability of the protocols presented below will also hold with respect to the Camenisch-
Michels denition.
The proof of membership is non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) if the prover is the
initiator and sends a single message and if the protocol satises the following property.
Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge. There exists a probabilistic polynomial time oracle
machine B such that for any x 2 L, any w 2 L(x), and any KVp , given a random rP , rB,
4 As an artefact of the quite unfortunate standard terminology, we can see that we have an undeniable
signature scheme with a deniable protocol which is a deniable proof itself!
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and Gen, we have 
Gen;PGen(x;KVp ; w; rP )

 B(x;KVp ; rB)
where B(x;KVp ; rB) generates an algorithm dening a function which simulates Gen.
Trapdoor Commitment Scheme. We use trapdoor commitment schemes [11]. These were used
by Jakobsson et al. [31] to construct non-transferable proofs. We will follow their method-
ology as well. Trapdoor commitment schemes are made of three probabilistic algorithms.
The rst one generates a pair of keys (Kp;Ks). The second one is a commitment algo-
rithm Commit and the third one is a collision algorithm Equivocate. On a given message
m and random coins dec (which will be used as the decommitment value), the commitment
value is com = Commit(Kp;m; dec). To open a commitment means to release m and dec
and to check that it produces the correct commitment value. The Equivocate algorithm sat-
ises the following property: for any message m and any commitment value com, running
Equivocate(Ks;m; com) produces a uniformly distributed string dec among all those such that
com = Commit(Kp;m; dec). Interestingly, Equivocate is not meant to be used at all. We only
need its existence as a security warranty. Somehow, it is a \life jacket algorithm".
We want our commitment scheme to achieve binding and hiding properties. A commitment
scheme is computationally binding if no probabilistic polynomial time algorithm launched with
a randomKVp can output two distinct messagesm,m0, two decommitment values dec, dec
0, one
commitment value com such that com = Commit(Kp;m; dec) and com = Commit(Kp;m; dec
0)
with non-negligible probability. We denote the success probability of an algorithm A in this
game by Succcom-bndA . A commitment scheme is perfectly hiding if the distribution of com given
by com = Commit(Kp;m; dec) is uniformly distributed for any Kp and m. For an example
of a perfectly-hiding and computationally-binding trapdoor commitment scheme, we refer to
Bresson et al. [12].
Trapdoor One-Way Permutations over a set S of bitstrings of a given xed length (depending
on the security parameter) are made of three algorithms. The rst one generates a pair
of keys (Kp;Ks). The other two are deterministic and map x 2 S to TPOW(Kp; x) resp.
TPOW 1(Ks; x) both in S. They must be such that TPOW 1(Ks;TPOW(Kp; x)) = x for
any x. Here again, TPOW 1 is a life jacket algorithm which is not meant to ever be used
in our constructions. We denote Succinv-tpA the probability for an adversary A to compute
TPOW 1(Ks; y) given a random (uniform) y 2 S, without knowing Ks.
3 Undeniable Signature
We consider two players who are the signer S and the verier V. Let k 2 N be a security
parameter,M the message space, and the signature space.5 An undeniable signature scheme
is composed of the four following algorithms.
Setup The setup is composed of two probabilistic polynomial time (in terms of k) algorithms
SetupS and SetupV producing the signer's key pair (KSp ;KSs ) SetupS(1k) and the veri-
er's key pair (KVp ;KVs ) SetupV(1k). Possible public keys are called well-formed.
5 Sometimes in the literature the signature space depends on the signing key. Since we do not need this we
assume a \xed" domain (i.e. depending on k) for simplicity reasons.
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Validate A deterministic polynomial time algorithm Validate(KSp ) is used to check that KSp
is well-formed.
Sign Let m 2 M be a message to sign. On the input of the signer's secret key KSs , the
polynomial time algorithm Sign generates a signature  = Sign(KSs ;m) which lies in .
In this paper we restrict to deterministic Sign algorithms. For all well-formed KSp , we say
that (KSp ;m; ) is valid if for all KSs such that (KSp ;KSs ) could be output by Setup
S , then
Sign(KSs ;m) = . Otherwise, we say that (KSp ;m; ) is invalid. We let Val resp. coVal be
the set of all valid resp. invalid (KSp ;m; ) triplets.
Conrm and Deny Let (m;) 2M be a message-signature pair. Conrm resp. Deny are
interactive algorithms which, together with the set of all possible (KVp ;KVs ), make a ZK
argument of membership between S and V for language Val (resp. coVal). The pair of inter-
active algorithms (ConrmS ;ConrmV) resp. (DenyS ;DenyV) have a tuple (KSp ;m; ;KVp )
as common input, witness input KSs for S, and auxiliary input KVs for V. In these ZK
arguments, provers must be polynomially bounded. (Recall that veriers are bounded by
denition of interactive algorithms.)
An execution of the conrmation resp. denial between S and V with private input KSs
and KVs will be denoted by VerifyS(KSs ; rS)
KSp ;m;;KVp ! VerifyV(KVs ; rV ) for Verify = Conrm or
Verify = Deny. Correctness of the undeniable signature scheme comes from the completeness
of the two interactive protocols. This requires that under honest execution of all algorithms,
a valid resp. invalid tuple is always proven as such by the signer to the designated verier.
Remark 3.1. For basic undeniable signature, we do not need keys for the verier. They will
be needed later to address non-transferability. This way, the signer can decide to run an
argument for a verier which is designated by its public key in the tuple instance.
Remark 3.2. Following Kurosawa [33], the undeniable signature SetupS should provide a sig-
nature simulator together with KSp to guarantee invisibility. Here we assume that this simu-
lator always generates uniformly distributed samples in  and do not depend on KSp .
Following [33], the scheme should also provide a Check(KSs ;m; ) signature checking algo-
rithm. Here we concentrate on deterministic Sign algorithm so that Check(KSs ;m; ) consists
of checking the  = Sign(KSs ;m) equation.
Following [33], undeniable signatures come with the following security properties: unforge-
ability and invisibility, in addition to the ZK properties of Conrm and Deny. Unforgeability
ensures non-repudiation so that we can call the scheme a signature scheme. Non-repudiation
is formalized by resisting adaptive existential forgery attacks. Invisibility with respect to
an active attacker who tries to distinguish a valid message-signature pair from a randomly
picked one is considered. It thus protects privacy. ZK argument of membership assumes com-
putational soundness of the proof and zero-knowledge. In addition to this, we will consider
non-transferability. This last property ensures that a malicious verier is not able to convince
any third party of the validity of the statement (e.g., a given message signature is valid)
proven in the protocol. The non-transferability notion may be important in some applications
where the validity of the argument itself is valuable (like for licensing software).
We consider the standard security notion of existential forgery under an adaptive chosen-
message attack as dened by Goldwasser et al. [29] for classical digital signatures. This notion
is similar to Kurosawa-Heng [34] and is adapted as follows.
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Existential Unforgeability. An undeniable signature scheme is secure against an existen-
tial forgery under adaptive chosen-message attack if there exists no probabilistic polyno-
mial time algorithm F which wins the following game with a non-negligible probability.
Game: F receives a public key KSp from (KSp ;KSs )  SetupS(1k) and a verier's
key pair (KVp ;KVs )  SetupV(1k). Then, F can query some chosen messages to a
signing oracle, some chosen pairs (m;) 2 M  to a conrmation (and denial)
protocol oracle and interact with it in a conrmation (denial) protocol where the
oracle plays the role of the signer. All these queries must be polynomially bounded
in k and can be sent adaptively. F wins the game if it outputs a valid pair (m; ) 2
M such that m was not queried to the signing oracle.
The success probability of F in this game is denoted by Succef-cmaF .
We use a similar denition as Kurosawa-Heng [34].
Invisibility. Consider rst a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm D called invisibility
distinguisher and the two following games with respect to a bit b.
Gameinv-cma-b. D receives the public key KSp from (KSp ;KSs )  SetupS(1k) and
a verier's key pair (KVp ;KVs )  SetupV(1k), it can query some chosen messages
to a signing oracle and some chosen message-signature pairs (m;) 2 M  to
an oracle telling whether (m;) is valid or not. At some point, D chooses one
message m 2M which was not queried to the signing oracle and submits it to the
challenger. If b = 0, he sets  = Sign(KSs ;m). Otherwise,  is picked uniformly
at random in . D receives . After that, the distinguisher can query the signing,
conrmation, and denial oracles again provided that m is not a query of the
signing oracle and (m; ) is not a query of the conrmation or denial protocols.
Finally, D outputs a guess bit b0.
We dene the advantage of the distinguisher as follows
Advinv-cmaD =
Pr b0 = 1 in Gameinv-cma-1  Pr b0 = 1 in Gameinv-cma-0 ;
where probabilities are over the random tapes of the involved algorithms. An undeniable
signature scheme is said to be invisible under a chosen-message attack if there exists no
probabilistic polynomial time algorithm D with a non-negligible advantage.
Note that this denition is similar to that of Galbraith et al. [23] except that the dis-
tinguisher is not allowed to query m to the signing oracle in our denition. The invisibility
notion of Galbraith et al. cannot be satised when the signature is deterministic (which is
the case for MOVA). This will be discussed in Remark 5.3.
4 Interpolation of Group Homomorphisms
4.1 Problem Denitions
We dene several generic problems related to some arbitrary Abelian groups. Later, these
groups will be generated by a specic setup algorithm and some attached trapdoor will render
some of the problems easy.
The concept of group homomorphism interpolation is dened below.
Denition 4.1. Let G, H be two Abelian groups and S be a subset of GH written in the
form S = f(x1; y1); : : : ; (xs; ys)g.
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1. We say that the set of points S interpolates in a group homomorphism if there exists a
group homomorphism f : G  ! H such that f(xi) = yi for i = 1; : : : ; s.
2. We say that a set of points B  G  H interpolates in a group homomorphism with
another set of points A  GH if A [B interpolates in a group homomorphism.
Group Homomorphism Interpolation Problem
We state here the Group Homomorphism Interpolation problem (GHI problem) and its cor-
responding decisional problem (GHID problem). All problems assume parameters dening
two Abelian groups G and H, a set S  G  H of cardinality s, and a positive integer n.
We dene the language LGHI(n; S)  (G H)n of all tuples interpolating with S in a group
homomorphism, as well as its complement LcoGHI(n; S) = (GH)nnLGHI(n; S).
n-S-GHI Problem (n-S-Group Homomorphism Interpolation Problem):
Instance: n elements x1; : : : ; xn in G.
Problem: Find y1; : : : ; yn 2 H such that ((x1; y1); : : : ; (xn; yn)) 2 LGHI(n; S).
The success probability of an n-S-GHI solver A is denoted by Succn-S-GHIA .
n-S-GHID Problem (n-S-GHI Decisional Problem):
Instance Generation: The instance T is generated according to one of the two following
ways and is denoted T0 or T1 respectively. Following T0, an n-tuple of points is picked
uniformly at random in the language LGHI(n; S). Following T1, an n-tuple of points is
picked uniformly at random in (GH)n.
Problem: Decide whether the instance T is of type T0 or T1.
The advantage of an n-S-GHID distinguisher D is given by
Advn-S-GHIDD =
 Prinstance2ULGHI(n;S)[D(instance) = 0]  Prinstance2U (GH)n[D(instance) = 0]
 :
Remark 4.2. The uniform distribution in LGHI(n; S) does not seem easy to produce in general.
However, when S uniquely determines a homomorphism f , one can generate T0 by picking
the xi's uniformly at random and setting yi = f(xi) for i = 1; : : : ; n.
We will only consider n-S-GHI and n-S-GHID problems with a set S which interpolate
in a unique group homomorphism. The n-S-GHI problem consists in evaluating the uniquely
dened homomorphism on n elements. The n-S-GHID problem essentially consists in deciding
whether all points of T lie in its graph. Later, in Section 4.2, we will provide instances of GHI
and GHID problems.
Related Computational Problems
We also consider the following problems.
d-G-MGGD Problem in G (Modular Group Generation Decisional Problem):
Parameters: An Abelian group G, a positive integer d.
Instance: A set of values S1  G.
Problem: Does S1 modulo dG span G=dG?
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By Lemma 4.3 below, we show that S = f(x1; y1); : : : ; (xs; ys)g interpolates in at most one
group homomorphism if and only if S1 = fx1; : : : ; xsg spans G=dG modulo dG, where d is
the order of H. We let LMGGD(d;G) be the set of all S1 which span G=dG.
(d; S1)-MSR Problem in G (Modular System Representation Problem):
Parameters: An Abelian group G, a set S1  G (of values denoted x1; : : : ; xs below), and
a positive integer d.
Instance: An element x 2 G.
Problem: Find a1; : : : ; as 2 Z such that x 2 a1x1 +    + asxs + dG. If no solution exists,
output ?.
d-G-Root Problem in G (dth Root Problem):
Parameters: An Abelian group G and a positive integer d.
Instance: An element x 2 dG.
Problem: Find r 2 G such that x = dr.
Group Expert. When a participant has a key to run a polynomial-time algorithm to solve the
(d; S1)-MSR and the d-G-Root problems, we say that it is a group expert for G relative to
(d; S1).
4.2 Preliminaries
This subsection is devoted to technical lemmas related to the interpolation of group homo-
morphisms. In particular, we provide some criteria for a set to interpolate in at most one
group homomorphism and we show how to sample elements uniformly.
Uniqueness of the Interpolation
Lemma 4.3. Let G, H be two nite Abelian groups, and d be the order of H. Let x1; : : : ; xs 2
G which span a subgroup denoted by G0. The following properties are equivalent. In this case,
we say that x1; : : : ; xs H-generate G.
1. For any y1; : : : ; ys 2 H, there exists at most one group homomorphism f : G  ! H such
that f(xi) = yi for all i = 1; : : : ; s.
2. There exists a unique group homomorphism ' : G  ! H such that '(xi) = 0 for i =
1; : : : ; s, namely ' = 0.
3. The set Hom(G=G0; H) of all group homomorphisms from G=G0 to H is restricted to f0g.
4. gcd(#(G=G0); d) = 1.
5. G0 + dG = G.
6. The cosets x1 + dG; : : : ; xs + dG span G=dG.
Proof. 1 ) 2. This directly follows by choosing yi = 0 for all i = 1; : : : ; s.
2 ) 1. Assume that there exist two group homomorphisms f1, f2 from G to H such that
f1(xi) = f2(xi) = yi for all i = 1; : : : ; s. Then, by assertion 2, we deduce that the group
homomorphism f1   f2 must be equal to the homomorphism 0.
2 ) 3. Suppose that there exists a homomorphism ' : G=G0 ! H which is not equal to
0. Let G0 : G ! G=G0 denote the canonical projection. We dene the homomorphism ' =
'  G0 from G to H. By denition, G0(xi) = 0 and therefore '(xi) = 0 for any i = 1; : : : ; s.
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Moreover, since G0 is onto and ' is not trivial, ' must be dierent from 0, which contradicts
the assertion 2.
3 ) 4. Suppose the existence of a common prime factor p of #(G=G0) and d. Then, from
the structure of Abelian groups, G=G0 and H must both possess one cyclic subgroup U and
V respectively of order p. Let 0 denote the exponent of the group G=G0. By the structure
of Abelian groups, we can choose U of the form 0=p  (G=G0). Hence, we have a group
homomorphism
' : G=G0  ! U
x 7 ! 0p x
which is onto. So, we can dene a non trivial homomorphism which is the composition of '
and the isomorphism between U and V . This contradicts 3.
4 ) 5. Let x 2 G and k = ord(x mod G0) be the order of x mod G0 in the quotient group
G=G0. By the assertion 4, d must be invertible modulo k. Let m 2 Z such that m  d  1
(mod k). We have m d x  x (mod G0). Hence, x d(m x) 2 G0 and therefore x 2 G0+dG.
5 ) 2. Let ' 2 Hom(G;H) such that 'jG0 = 0 and x 2 G. By assertion 5, we can write
x = a1x1 +   + asxs + dr for some integers a1; : : : ; as and an element r 2 G. Thus, '(x) =
d'(r) = 0. This holds for any x 2 G, i.e., ' = 0.
5 , 6. This follows from G0 + dG = G, fx0 + dG j x0 2 G0g = G=dG. ut
Remark 4.4. Replacing d by the exponent  ofH in assertions 5 and 6 leads to some equivalent
assertions.
Note that the criteria 4-6 suggest that H is only involved by the prime factors in its order.
Later, the smallest prime factor p will play an important role. Note also that if G = H,
these criteria mean that x1; : : : ; xs generate G. Furthermore, from the assertion 6, we see that
S1 2 LMGGD(d;G) is equivalent to say that S1 H-generate G.
Existence of the Interpolation
Here is a condition allowing to determine whether a set of points interpolates in a group
homomorphism. The following result assumes that the G-coordinates of this set of points
H-generate G so that the group homomorphism is unique when it exists.
Lemma 4.5. Let G, H, and d be as in Lemma 4.3. Let x1; : : : ; xs 2 G which H-generate G.
The set S = f(x1; y1); : : : ; (xs; ys)g  G  H interpolates in a group homomorphism if and
only if for any a1; : : : ; as 2 Z such that a1x1 +   + asxs 2 dG, we have a1y1 +   + asys = 0.
Proof. \)": By assumption, there exists a homomorphism f : G! H such that f(xi) = yi
for i = 1; : : : ; s. Since dG lies in the kernel of f , we have f(a1x1+  +asxs) = a1y1+  +asys =
0, whenever a1x1 +   + asxs 2 dG.
\(". By the assertion 5 of Lemma 4.3, we know that any element x 2 G can be written in
the form x = dr + a1x1 +    + asxs for some integers a1; : : : ; as and an element r 2 G. We
now dene a function f : G! H such that f(dr + a1x1 +   + asxs) = a1y1 +   + asys for
any a1; : : : ; as 2 Z and r 2 G. It remains to prove that f is well-dened on G and that it is
homomorphic. Assume that an element x 2 G admits two dierent representations, i.e.,
x = dr + a1x1 +   + asxs = dr0 + a01x1 +   + a0sxs:
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By assumption, we must have (a1   a01)y1 +   + (as   a0s)y0s = 0, and therefore
f(dr + a1x1 +   + asxs) = f(dr0 + a01x1 +   + a0sxs):
Finally, the homomorphic property of f follows from the linearity in the ai's. ut
Remark 4.6. Note that we can replace d by the exponent  of the group H in Lemma 4.5.
Remark 4.7. Lemma 4.5 does not hold anymore if we relax the assumption stating that the
elements x1; : : : ; xs H-generate G. Choosing G = Z27, H = Z9  Z3, s = 1, x1 = 3, and
y1 = (0; 1) illustrates this fact.
Examples of GHI and GHID Problems
We can often meet the GHI and GHID problems in cryptography as the following examples
suggest. Here, we exclusively consider 1-GHI and 1-GHID variants.
Example 4.8 (DL parameters). We take a cyclic group G of order q, H = Zq, and a generator
g of G. The set S = f(g; 1)g interpolates in a unique group homomorphism, and the GHI
problem is exactly the discrete logarithm problem. The GHID problem is easy.
Example 4.9 (DH parameters). We take a cyclic group G = H of order q, and a generator
g of G. For any a 2 Zq, S = f(g; ag)g interpolates in a unique group homomorphism: the
exponentiation to the power a. The GHI and GHID problems correspond to the Die-Hellman
problem [22] and the decisional Die-Hellman problem with static key a.
Example 4.10 (QR parameters). Let n = pq such that p; q are dierent odd primes and
H = f 1;+1g. We let x1; x2 2 Zn be such that x1 is a quadratic residue modulo p and not
modulo q, and that x2 is a quadratic residue modulo q, and not modulo p. We notice that
S = f(x1; 1); (x2; 1)g interpolates in a unique group homomorphism which is the Legendre
symbol (=p). Since it is easy to compute (=n), the quadratic residuosity problem [28] with
the information x1 and x2 is equivalent to the GHI and GHID problems.
Example 4.11 (RSA parameters). Here, we consider the well known RSA cryptosystem [52].
Let n = pq be an RSA modulus and G = H = Zn. Let f : Zn ! Zn be dened by
f(x) = xe mod n for an exponent e such that gcd(e; '(n)) = 1. Given enough many pairs
(xei mod n; xi) 2 Zn  Zn, i = 1; : : : ; s, such that the rst coordinates generate Zn, the RSA
problem corresponds to the GHI problem with S composed of the above pairs and e known.
If e is known, the GHID problem is easy in this case.
Example 4.12 (BDH parameters). We show here how we can apply the GHI problem to the
Bilinear Die-Hellman Problem (BDHP). This problem was used in the seminal paper of
Boneh and Franklin [7, 8] to propose an identity-based encryption scheme based on it. Let
e^ : G1 G1 ! G2 be a bilinear, non-degenerate and computable mapping, where G1 and G2
are cyclic groups of a large prime order p. Let P be a generator of G1, we can state the BDHP
as follows: given three random elements aP , bP and cP 2 G1, compute e^(P; P )abc. (G1 resp.
G2 is written additively resp. multiplicatively.) BDHP is equivalent to GHI problem with the
set S = f(P; e^(aP; bP ))g and x1 = cP when S is refreshed for each instance with some a and
b picked uniformly at random in Zp.
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Example 4.13 (Paillier parameters). Let consider the Paillier trapdoor function [49] that maps
an element (x; y) 2 ZnZn to the element gx  yn mod n2 of Zn2 , with g an element of Zn2 of
order n. For such a g, the Paillier trapdoor function is an isomorphism. Thus, assuming we
have s pairs of plaintext/ciphertext that generate ZnZn resp. Zn2 , the decryption problem of
a challenged ciphertext corresponds to the GHI problem with G = Zn2 and H = ZnZn. This
application of GHI problem to the decryption problem can be adapted to every homomorphic
trapdoor function. Again, if the public key is known, the GHID problem is easy.
Note that Examples 4.9, 4.10, 4.11, 4.12, and 4.13 include trapdoors in order to interpolate
the group homomorphism. Furthermore, Example 4.10 includes a trapdoor in order to solve
the MSR and 2-G-Root problems, thus to make a group expert relative to any (2; S1). Also
note that the order d of H is publicly known in Examples 4.8, 4.9, 4.10, 4.12. It is further
quite small in Example 4.10. We will also consider the following example inspired by [1].
Example 4.14 (Newton parameters). Let n = pq such that p = rd + 1 and q are prime,
gcd(r; d) = 1, gcd(q   1; d) = 1, with d small prime. We take G = Zn and H = Zd. We can
easily compute a group homomorphism by rst raising to the power r(q  1) then computing
a discrete logarithm in a small cyclic subgroup of order d.
Our construction for a signature scheme requires the hardness of the GHI problem (for
unforgeability), the hardness of the GHID problem (for invisibility), a trapdoor for interpo-
lation (for computability), d publicly known, and sometimes a group expertise. So, in what
follows we focus on DH, QR, BDH, and Newton parameters in Examples 4.9, 4.10, 4.12, 4.14,
respectively.
Parameters GHI GHID trapdoor d known expert
DL hard easy no yes no
DH hard hard yes yes no
QR hard hard yes yes yes
RSA hard easy yes no no
BDH hard hard yes yes no
Paillier hard easy yes no no
Newton hard hard yes yes yes
Sampling G uniformly
Lemma 4.15. Let f : G! H be a surjective group homomorphism from the group G to the
group H. Then, f is balanced, i.e., #f 1(y) = #Ker(f) for any y 2 H:
Proof. Let x; x0 2 G and y = f(x). The lemma follows by noticing that f(x0) = y if and only
if x0 2 x+ Ker(f): ut
We provide a useful lemma to sample group elements.
Lemma 4.16. Let G, H, d be dened as in Lemma 4.5. Let x1; : : : ; xs 2 G which H-generate
G. The following mapping from G Zsd to G is balanced
g : (r; a1; : : : ; as) 7 ! dr + a1x1 +   + asxs: (4.1)
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By abuse of notation, Zd denotes the set f0; 1; : : : ; d  1g here. Note that g is not necessarily
a group homomorphism because some xi may have orders larger than d.
Proof. Let n be the order of G. Let h : GZsnd ! G be a function dened by h(r; a1; : : : ; as) =
dr + a1x1 +    + asxs. Obviously, h is a homomorphism. It is onto due to the assertion 5
of Lemma 4.3. Hence, it is balanced by Lemma 4.15. Let ' : G  Zsnd ! G  Zsd be a
function dened by '(r; a1; : : : ; as) = (r + q1x1 +    + qsxs; a1 mod d; : : : ; as mod d); where
ai   (ai mod d) = dqi, for i = 1; : : : ; s. We have g  ' = h. We note that ' is balanced onto
G Zsd since
' 1(r; a1; : : : ; as) = f(r   q1x1        qsxs; a1 + dq1; : : : ; as + dqs) j (q1; : : : ; qs) 2 Zsng:
If #g 1(x) = m, we have mns = #' 1
 
g 1(x)

= #h 1(x) = (dn)s. Hence, m = ds does
not depend on x, so g is balanced. ut
Remark 4.17. Lemma 4.16 also holds if d is replaced by the exponent  of the group H.
Note that a group expert relative to (d; fx1; : : : ; xsg) knows how to invert g in Lemma 4.16.
We show here that this ability even allows to pick an element in g 1(x) uniformly at random
for any x 2 G. Since g' = h, we have g 1(x) = 'h 1(x). Because ' is balanced it is enough
to sample an element of h 1(x). For that, we only need one element and we can randomize
it by adding a random element from h 1(0). For that, we pick a tuple  2U G  Zsnd, apply
our group expertise and retrieve a tuple t0 2 g 1(h()). We can then compute    (t0) where
 (t0) is any function such that '   is the identity mapping. Finally, we obtain
t = '
 
 (t0) +     (t0)

where t0 2 g 1(x); t0 2 g 1(h())
The representation t is uniformly distributed in g 1(x).
4.3 Approximations of the Homomorphism
In this subsection we present a hardness result of approximation related to the existence of a
homomorphism which interpolates a set of points. This is inspired by the theory of checkable
proofs [2, 3].
Lemma 4.18. Given two nite Abelian groups G and H, and a set of s points S = f(xi; yi) j i =
1; : : : ; sg  GH such that x1; : : : ; xs H-generate G. We let d be the order of H and p be its
smallest prime factor. We assume that S does not interpolate in any group homomorphism
and dene for any x 2 G the set Ux = f(r; a1; : : : ; as) 2 GZsd j dr+ a1x1+   + asxs = xg:
Then, for any x 2 G and any y 2 H, we have
Pr
(r;a1;:::;as)2UUx
[a1y1 +   + asys = y] = 0 or ;
for a constant   1=p. Therefore, for any x 2 G and any function f : G! H, we have
Pr
(r;a1;:::;as)2UUx
[f(x) = a1y1 +   + asys]  1
p
:
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Proof. Let K be the subgroup of Zsd dened by K = f(a1; : : : ; as) 2 Zsd j a1x1 +   + asxs 2
dGg: By Lemma 4.5, the image of g : (b1; : : : ; bs) 7! b1y1 +    + bsys dened on K is a
subgroup of order greater or equal to p. Moreover, by Lemma 4.15, g is balanced on its image,
which shows that
Pr
(b1;:::;bs)2UK
[b1y1 +   + bsys = y] = 0 or 
for any y 2 H, where  = 1=jIm(g)j. Let x be an arbitrary element of G. We can deduce that
for any xed tuple (r0; b01; : : : ; b0s) 2 Ux, we also have
Pr
(b1;:::;bs)2UK
[(b1 + b
0
1)y1 +   + (bs + b0s)ys = y] = 0 or 
for any y 2 H. This is equivalent to Pr(a1;:::;as)2UVx [a1y1 +    + asys = y] = 0 or , for
any y 2 H, where Vx = f(a1; : : : ; as) j 9r 2 G s.t. (r; a1; : : : ; as) 2 Uxg. Here, we remark
that for any tuple (a1; : : : ; as) 2 Vx, there exists the same number of elements r 2 G such
that (r; a1; : : : ; as) 2 Ux. Namely, this number is equal to the cardinality of the kernel of
the homomorphism r 7! dr dened on G, which is equal to #G=#dG. From this, we nally
deduce that
Pr
(r;a1;:::;as)2UUx
[a1y1 +   + asys = y] = Pr
(a1;:::;as)2UVx
[a1y1 +   + asys = y] = 0 or ;
for any y 2 H. ut
Corollary 4.19. Let G, H, S, d, and p as in Lemma 4.18. We assume that there exists a
function f : G  ! H such that
 = Pr
(r;a1;:::;as)2UGZsd
[f(dr + a1x1 +   + asxs) = a1y1 +   + asys] > 1
p
:
The set of points S interpolates in a group homomorphism. Furthermore, given x 2U G, the
value y = f(x) matches the unique interpolation with probability .
The above result can be extended to the computability of the homomorphism. Similarly
as above and using techniques of linear cryptanalysis [32], one can eciently amplify such a
function f to compute the homomorphism with a negligible error probability. More details
about this can be found in [41,43].
4.4 A 4-Move ZK Protocol for GHI and coGHI
In this section, we develop some interactive proof protocols for GHI and coGHI under the
assumption that group expert algorithm exists.
Let G, H be parameters of a GHID problem. Let ` 2 N be a security parameter. We note
that \T interpolates with S" is equivalent to \S [ T interpolates" so we use a single set N
as input without loss of generality. We present here an interactive proof of membership in
which a prover wants to convince a verier that N interpolates in a group homomorphism
f : G  ! H used as a witness. This protocol is denoted GHIproof `(N) and is depicted
below.
GHIproof `(N)
Parameters: G;H; d; `
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Common input: N = f(g1; e1); : : : ; (gn; en)g  G  H, the public key KVp of the
verier
Witness input: f such that f(gi) = ei, i = 1; : : : ; n
1: The verier picks ri 2U G and ai;j 2U Zd for i = 1; : : : ; ` and j = 1; : : : ; n. He
computes ui = dri+ai;1g1+  +ai;ngn and wi = ai;1e1+  +ai;nen for i = 1; : : : ; `.
He sends u1; : : : ; u` to the prover.
2: The prover computes the values vi = f(ui) for i = 1; : : : ; `, picks dec, and the
commitment com = Commit(KVp ; v1; : : : ; v`; dec). He sends com to the verier.
3: The verier sends all ri's and ai;j 's to the prover.
4: The prover checks that the ui's were computed correctly by verifying that ui =
dri + ai;1g1 +   + ai;ngn holds for i = 1; : : : ; `. If not, he aborts the protocol. He
then opens his commitment by sending dec.
5: The verier checks that the commitment is opened correctly, i.e.,
com = Commit(KVp ; w1; : : : ; w`; dec):
If this is the case, the verier accepts the proof. Otherwise, he rejects it.
The commitment scheme is crucial to achieve zero-knowledge, since it allows the prover
to disclose the answers vi's after having checked that the verier generated the challenges
correctly. Otherwise, a malicious verier could use the prover as an oracle to evaluate the
function f on any element of G. Note also that the parameter ` corresponds to the number of
challenges sent by the verier and is thus directly related to the security level of GHIproof .
For asymptotic security, this one can be seen as a function of a global security parameter k.
Theorem 4.20. We consider the above protocol GHIproof with parameters G, H, d, ` and
a trapdoor commitment scheme which is computationally binding and perfectly hiding. We let
S be a subset of G  H and S1 be the set of all G-coordinates of its elements. Let t be an
integer. If for any N1 such that S1  N1  G there exists a group expert algorithm relative to
(d;N1), then GHIproof(S [ T ) is a ZK argument of membership for T 2 LGHI(t; S). More
precisely, we have the following properties.
1. Let p be the smallest prime factor of d. For any " > p `, GHIproof is "-sound. From
any cheating signer S who passes the protocol on an invalid N with a probability " and a
group expert we can construct an algorithm B which nds a collision on the commitment
scheme with a probability
Succcom-bndB  "("  p `)
by rewinding S once.
2. GHIproof is perfect black-box zero-knowledge.
3. GHIproof is perfect non-transferable.
Proof. Completeness is trivial.
Soundness. By Corollary 4.19, if the set N does not admit any interpolating homomorphism,
it is impossible to nd any procedure to deduce wi =
Pn
j=1 ai;jej from ui = dri+
Pn
j=1 ai;jgj
with probability greater than 1=p, for any i = 1; : : : ; `. Since the challenges ui's are generated
independently, no prover is able to nd the correct w = (w1; : : : ; w`) from the challenge
u = (u1; : : : ; u`) with probability greater than p
 `. Below, we show that a (cheating) prover
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P must break the binding property of Commit with non-zero probability in order to succeed
in the protocol with a probability " > p `.
We construct below a simulator B who interacts with P and plays the role of an honest
verier. The simulator will launch 2 protocol runs sequentially with P in such a way that a
collision on Commit can be found with a certain probability. For this, he rewinds the prover to
play twice with the same inputs, coins, and challenge. We stress that this is allowed as long as
the prover receives messages which are correctly distributed in both runs of the protocol. So,
if we look at both runs separately, the prover cannot see any dierence from an interaction
with an honest verier.
The simulator B picks some coecients ai;j 's and ri's uniformly at random and computes
the challenges ui's. He then sends u to P. This one answers a committed value com. The
simulator releases the coecients ai;j 's and ri's to P. At the end, P succeeds if he opens
the commitment correctly on the values wi's. If he does not succeed, the simulator aborts.
Otherwise, using his group expertise, the simulator nds some coecients ai;j 's and r

i 's
satisfying
ui = dr

i +
nX
j=1
ai;jgj for i = 1; : : : ; `;
and which are picked uniformly at random among all possible representations of the ui's. Now,
B rewinds the prover with the same random tape. The simulator sends the same challenges
ui's as before. Therefore, the prover answers the same commitment com. At this time, B
releases the coecients ai;j 's and r

i 's to P. This one succeeds if he is able to open com on
the values wi =
Pn
j=1 a

i;jej for i = 1; : : : ; `. In case of success, the simulator directly nds a
collision with respect to Commit if wi 6= wi holds for at least one i.
It remains to compute the probability that this event occurs. At rst, we note that the
simulations are perfect in both runs of the protocol. Namely, if we look at both protocol runs
independently, we remark that all coecients ri; ai;j are chosen uniformly at random. We now
have to take into account that rewinding the prover with the same random tape and the same
challenges is a restriction in the space of all possible protocol runs. So, we decompose the
probability of success according to the random tape $ of P and challenges u. Note that once
the random tape and the challenge are xed, both protocol runs are independent.
Let A be the probability event that P succeeds in the rst protocol run and E$;u be the
event that the random tape is $ and the challenge is u. Similarly, we dene the same event
A for the second protocol run. We set Pr[AjE$;u] = Pr[AjE$;u] = "$;u. We also denote by
B the event that w 6= w, where w = (w1; : : : ; w` ). Since A and A conditioned to E$;u are
independent, we have
Pr[A ^AjE$;u] = "2$;u:
From this, we deduce that
Pr[A ^A ^BjE$;u]  "2$;u   Pr[A ^A ^ :BjE$;u]  "2$;u   Pr[A ^ :BjE$;u]
holds. Note that Pr[:BjA;E$;u]  p ` by Lemma 4.18: no matter the values of u and w,
picking the a and r leading to the same u at random will give the same w = w with
probability bounded by p `. Hence, Pr[A ^ :BjE$;u]  "$;up `. We obtain that
Pr[A ^A ^BjE$;u]  "$;u("$;u   p `)
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Applying Jensen's inequality we obtain
Pr[A ^A ^B]  "("  p `)
where " is the probability that P passes the proof with a honest verier. This leads us to
the desired result.
Zero-Knowledge. We construct a black-box simulator B which is given an instance T 2
LGHI(n; S), the public key K
V
p of the verier, and an auxiliary input z for the malicious
verier V. As usual, we let N = S [ T .
1. The simulator rst runs V(T;KVp ; z; rV ) and gets the list u of the ui's. (If these are not
well formed, the simulator stops with (T;KVp ; z; rV ; abort) which perfectly simulates the
view after interacting with the prover.)
2. Then, the simulator commits to some dummy vi's and sends the commit value com to V.
Since the commitment is perfectly hiding, the commit value has the perfect distribution
as if it was from the honest prover.
3. If V reveals incorrect ai;j 's and ri's, the simulator stops with (T;KVp ; z; rV ; com; abort)
which perfectly simulates the view. Otherwise, the simulator can now compute the correct
vi's, rewind the verier and go back to the commit phase on the correct vi's.
4. After rewinding and committing again, if the verier does not return any correct ai;j 's and
ri's, rewind again until it works. Even though the ai;j 's and ri's may have changed, the
vi's are uniquely dened by the ui's. So, any correct ai;j 's and ri's may allow the simulator
to produce an accepting view with perfect distribution.
One caveat though: the loop in the last step may be non-polynomial. However, the expected
complexity of the simulator remains polynomial. Indeed, given some xed (T;KVp ; z; rV ),
let p be the probability (over the distribution induced by com) that V(T;KVp ; z; com; rV )
reveals some correct ai;j 's and ri's. The expected number of V(T;KVp ; z; com; rV ) calls in the
simulator is
(1  p) + p

1 +
1
p

which is 2. So, we rewind only once on average and the simulator has a polynomial average
complexity.
Non-Transferability. Following the denition of non-transferability, the malicious prover P is
given the trapdoor KVs of the commitment. So, after receiving the challenge u = (u1; : : : ; u`)
from V, he can make a junk commitment by picking w0 = (w01; : : : ; w0`) 2U H` uniformly at
random and computing com0 = Commit(KVp ; w0; dec
0). Then he can send com0 to V. Then,
the verier sends the values ri's and ai;j 's to P. He can check whether these values satisfy
ui = dri +
Pn
j=1 ai;jgj for i = 1; : : : ; `. If it is not the case, he answers abort. If it is the case,
he deduces the right tuple w and computes dec Equivocate(KVs ; w; com0). He then sends w,
dec to open the commitment com0. Note that in this case, the transcript of this interaction
is (u; com0; ri'n; ai;j 'n; w; dec). Since the commitment is perfectly hiding, the transcript has
exactly the same distribution as a transcript produced between an honest prover and the
verier V. ut
Let G, H, and S = f(g1; e1); : : : ; (gs; es)g  GH be parameters of a GHID problem, and
let d be the order ofH with smallest prime factor p. Let T = f(x1; z1); : : : ; (xt; zt)g  GH be
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a set of t points. We assume that S interpolates in a unique group homomorphism f : G! H.
A prover who wants to convince a verier that T 62 LGHI(t; S). For this, the prover makes
use of the knowledge of a group homomorphism f uniquely interpolating S. Let ` 2 N be a
security parameter. He performs the following interaction with a verier.
coGHIproof `(S; T )
Parameters: G;H; d; p; `; B such that 1 < B  p and B polynomially bounded
Common input: S = f(g1; e1); : : : ; (gs; es)g; T = f(x1; z1); : : : ; (xt; zt)g  GH, the
public key KVp of the verier
Witness input: f such that f(gi) = ei, i = 1; : : : ; s. We let yk = f(xk), k = 1; : : : ; t.
1: The verier picks ri;k 2U G, ai;j;k 2U Zd, and i 2U f0; 1; : : : ; B   1g for i =
1; : : : ; `, j = 1; : : : ; s, k = 1; : : : ; t. He computes ui;k = dri;k +
Ps
j=1 ai;j;kgj + ixk
and wi;k =
Ps
j=1 ai;j;kej + izk for all i and k. Set u = (u1;1; : : : ; u`;t) and w =
(w1;1; : : : ; w`;t). He sends u and w to the prover.
2: The prover computes vi;k = f(ui;k) for i = 1; : : : ; `, k = 1; : : : ; t. From the equation
wi;k   vi;k = i(zk   yk), he should be able to nd each i by exhaustive search
if the verier is honest, since yk 6= zk for at least one k. Otherwise, he picks
i 2U f0; 1; : : : ; B   1g uniformly at random for i = 1; : : : ; `. He computes com =
Commit(KVp ; ; dec), where  = (1; : : : ; `). The prover sends the committed value
com to the verier.
3: The verier sends all ri;k's and ai;j;k's to the prover.
4: The prover checks that u and w were correctly computed by verifying that ui;k =
dri;k +
Ps
j=1 ai;j;kgj + ixk and wi;k =
Ps
j=1 ai;j;kej + izk for all i and k. If not,
he aborts the protocol. He then opens the commitment by sending  and dec.
5: The verier checks that the prover has found the right  and that the commitment
is correctly opened by checking com = Commit(KVp ; ; dec). If this is the case, the
verier accepts the proof. Otherwise, he rejects it.
Remark 4.21. Provided that the discrete logarithm in H is easy, we can take B = p and
replace exhaustive search on i by a discrete logarithm algorithm.
This protocol was inspired from the denial protocol of Gennaro et al. [25]. This one can
actually be seen as a special case of ours with the RSA encryption function as homomorphism.
We also notice that  was chosen such that it can uniquely be retrieved from every nonzero
values of H that can be taken by the elements zk yk's. This is shown by the following result.
Lemma 4.22. Let H, d, p as above, and a; b 2 H such that b 6= 0. If the equation a = b
has a solution  in f0; 1; : : : ; p  1g, then this one is unique.
Proof. Let us rst consider the subgroup hbi generated by b. If there exists a solution to
the above equation, we must have a 2 hbi. Moreover, the coecient  is uniquely dened
modulo ord(b). By denition of p, we have ord(b)  p. Therefore,  is uniquely dened in
f0; 1; : : : ; p  1g. ut
Theorem 4.23. Let S be a set which interpolates in exactly one group homomorphism. We
consider the above coGHIproof protocol with parameters G, H, d, p, `, B. For any trapdoor
commitment scheme which is computationally binding and perfectly hiding, if there exists a
group expert relative to (d; S1) for any S1  G, coGHIproof is a ZK argument of membership
for the language LcoGHI(t; S) for any integer t. More precisely, we have the following properties.
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1. Let p be the smallest prime factor of d. For any " > B `, coGHIproof is "-sound. From
any cheating prover P who passes the protocol on T 62 LcoGHI(t; S) with a probability " and
a group expert relative to (d; S1), we can construct an algorithm B which nds a collision
on the commitment scheme with a probability at least "(" B `) by rewinding P once.
2. coGHIproof is perfect black-box zero-knowledge.
3. coGHIproof is perfect non-transferable.
Proof. Completeness is trivial.
Soundness. We rst remark that ui;k is uniformly distributed for any xed i for i = 1; : : : ; `
and k = 1; : : : ; t by Lemma 4.16. Moreover, if the set of points T interpolates in f , we have
f(xk) = zk for all k = 1; : : : ; t. By the homomorphic property of f , we have f(ui;k) = wi;k
for any i and k. Putting all together implies that the distribution of the challenge (ui;k; wi;k)
is completely independent of the value i for any i and k. Thus, a prover cannot deduce
the right i's with a probability greater than B
 ` from the challenges. Below, we show how
we can break the binding property of Commit using a prover succeeding with a probability
" > B `. To this, we proceed similarly as for proving the soundness of GHIproof . We run
the protocol once with the prover, rewind this one, and run the protocol with carefully chosen
coecients.
The simulator B rst picks the values ai;j;k's, ri;k's, and i's uniformly at random and
computes the tuples u = (u1;1; : : : ; u`;t) and w = (w1;1; : : : ; w`;t) according to the protocol.
Then, B sends u, w to the prover P. This one answers com. The simulator releases the
coecients ai;j;k's, ri;k's, i's, and the prover succeeds if he opens com on  = (1; : : : ; `).
Now, B picks  = (1; : : : ; ` ) uniformly at random. By using his group expertise, he is able
to nd some uniformly random coecients ai;j;k's, r

i;k's satisfying
ui;k   ixk = dri;k +
sX
j=1
ai;j;kgj for i = 1; : : : ; ` and k = 1; : : : ; t:
The simulator rewinds P with the same random tape and the same challenges. He answers
the same commitment com. This time, B sends ai;j;k's, ri;k's. The prover wins if he is able
to open com on the value . If  6= , B breaks the computationally binding property of
Commit.
Note that B simulates an honest verier perfectly in both protocol runs. We can com-
pute the success probability that B nds a collision for Commit in a very similar way as for
GHIproof . Namely, we decompose the probability of success for the dierent random tapes
$ and challenges u. Let "$;u be the probability that the prover wins in one protocol run
with the random tape $ and the challenge u (and thus w = f(u)). Since the probability that
 =  for any random tape $ and challenge u is equal to B `, we can show as forGHIproof
that the success probability of B is higher thanX
$;u
q$;u  ("2$;u   "$;u B `);
where q$;u denotes the probability that the protocol runs with the random tape $ and the
challenge u. Again, applying Jensen's inequality leads to the desired bound "(" B `).
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Zero-Knowledge. The simulation works as in GHIproof . One can rewind the verier and
achieve perfect zero-knowledge. We can just check that  is uniquely dened by u and w.
Indeed, if V provides (after rewinding once) two sets (r; a; ) and (r; a; ) with same u
and w we obtain that
(i   i )(f(xk)  zk) = 0
for all i and k. So, if f(xk) 6= zk we obtain that i = i for all i.
Non-Transferability. The simulation works as in GHIproof . One can use the trapdoor of the
commitment scheme to open the commitment on the desired value (correct answer). ut
4.5 A 2-Move ZK Protocol for GHI and coGHI in the Random Oracle Model
Below, we propose a 2-move variant of GHIproof . This variant is achieved by removing the
two messages sent in the middle of the protocol which allow to achieve zero-knowledge through
the commitment scheme. In order to maintain zero-knowledge, the verier sends a kind of
commitment on a seed which generates the coecients producing the challenges sent to the
prover. This commitment can only be opened by the prover after this one solved these chal-
lenges. For this, we introduce a pseudorandom generator Gen as well as a cryptographic hash
function denoted Gen0 which will be modeled by random oracles. We notably add a trapdoor
one-way permutation with associated secret key KVs in order to obtain non-transferability.
This 2-move protocol called 2GHIproof is described here.
2GHIproof `(N)
Parameters: G;H; d; `; k
Random oracles: Gen : f0; 1gk ! G`  Z`nd , Gen0 : H` ! f0; 1gk
Common input: N = f(g1; e1); : : : ; (gn; en)g  G  H, the public key KVp of the
verier
Witness input: f such that f(gi) = ei, i = 1; : : : ; n
1: The verier picks seed 2U f0; 1gk and by applying a pseudorandom generator Gen
on this seed, generates values ri 2 G and ai;j 2 Zd for i = 1; : : : ; ` and j = 1; : : : ; n.
He computes ui = dri+ai;1g1+  +ai;ngn, wi = ai;1e1+  +ai;nen for i = 1; : : : ; `,
and # = TPOW(KVp ; seed). Using a cryptographic hash function Gen
0, he computes
h = Gen0(w1; : : : ; w`) seed. The verier sends u1; : : : ; u`, h and # to the prover.
2: The prover computes vi = f(ui) for i = 1; : : : ; `, seed
0 = Gen0(v1; : : : ; v`)  h. He
checks that # = TPOW(KVp ; seed
0) and that Gen(seed0) generates values ai;j 's and
ri's such that ui = dri + ai;1g1 +   + ai;ngn for i = 1; : : : ; `. If not, the prover
aborts the protocol. He then sends seed0 to the verier.
3: The verier accepts the proof if seed0 = seed holds. Otherwise, he rejects it.
Note that the secret key KVs of the verier is unused in the protocol. Its availability will be
used to prove non-transferability.
The 2-move variant has a very similar complexity as the 4-move ones. In particular, the
prover needs to perform the same number of homomorphism evaluations. The computational
work related to Commit is replaced by the one induced by Gen, Gen0, TPOW.
Theorem 4.24. We consider the above 2GHIproof protocol with parameters G, H, d, `,
k. We assume that Gen and Gen0 are random oracles and that TPOW is a trapdoor one-way
permutation dened on domain f0; 1gk. 2GHIproof(S[T ) is a ZK argument of membership
for T 2 LGHI(n; S). More precisely, we have the following properties.
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1. Let p be the smallest prime factor of d. The protocol is sound: There is a probabilistic
polynomial time algorithm AP invoking P once and such that if P is a cheating prover
limited to qGen0 queries to Gen
0 and with a probability of success ", then AP inverts TPOW
on domain f0; 1gk with success probability higher than "  qGen0p `.
2. 2GHIproof is statistical black-box straight-line deniable zero-knowledge in the random
oracle model.
3. 2GHIproof is perfect non-transferable.
Proof. Completeness is trivial.
Soundness. Let P be a cheating prover who wants to pass the protocol with a common input
N which does not interpolate in a group homomorphism. We let KVp and KVs be the keys for
the verier and we assume that P $ V accepts with probability ".
When interacting with a honest verier, P wins if and only if it responds by seed such
that TPOW(KVp ; seed) = #. Note that it is easy to check whether a value seed
0 is equal to
seed because TPOW is deterministic. Without loss of generality, we can assume that P never
queries seed to Gen (indeed, he can rst check if this is the correct answer before querying).
Similarly, we can assume that P always responds correctly whenever he queries the right
w = (w1; : : : ; w`) to Gen
0 because he can check that Gen0(w)h is the correct seed. Therefore,
P always wins if the correct w is queried to Gen0 and never queries seed to Gen.
We transform P into an algorithm A inverting TPOW(KVp ; ) as follows.
1. A receives a random challenge #, whose preimage by TPOW is denoted seed. The goal of
A is to nd seed.
2. A generates some random values ri's and ai;j 's and deduces the corresponding ui's and
wi's. A further picks a random h. Then (u; h; #) is a challenge for the prover and A can
start simulating P.
Clearly, given a random Gen and Gen0, the simulation for P is perfect as long as seed is
not queried to Gen and w is not queried to Gen0. Since the former case never happens, A
simulates P and stops if w is queried to Gen0. In this case, A just fails.
3. The simulation of P leads to either a failure or a release of the correct value seed which
can be returned by A.
The algorithm succeeds to invert the trapdoor permutation at the condition that (event A)
P succeeds without querying w to Gen0. Let B be the event that P queries w to Gen0. Since
the simulation is perfect, Pr[A] + Pr[B] is the probability that P passes the protocol with
an honest verier. Clearly, Pr[A] is the probability that A succeeds in inverting TPOW. Thus
Pr[A]  Succinv-tp. Below we show an upper bound for Pr[B]. To this end, we consider a
simulator B which plays with P to win the following game:
Game: A challenger picks elements ri's and ai;j 's uniformly at random and computes
ui = dri+
Pn
j=1 ai;jgj . The simulator B receives the ui's and wins the game if he nds
the correct values wi =
Pn
j=1 ai;jej for i = 1; : : : ; `.
We transform P into an algorithm B as follows.
1. B receives a random challenge u.
2. B then picks a random seed, computes # = TPOW(KVp ; seed) and picks a random h.
Additionally, B picks an integer ` 2 f1; : : : ; qGen0g uniformly at random. Then (u; h; #) is
a challenge for the prover and B can start simulating P.
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Clearly, the simulation works just like for A as long as P does not query Gen0 with the
response w to the game. So, B just let P query Gen0 for the `  1 rst queries and stops
at the `th one. The value w0 of this last query is returned as the response to the game.
3. If the simulation P stops, then B just fails.
Clearly, B wins if and only if event B occurs and the simulator have guessed which of the
queries by P gave the correct answer. Therefore, B wins with probability 1=qGen0  Pr[B].
By Corollary 4.19, this probability is at most p ` which implies Pr[B]  qGen0p `. So, the
conrmation cannot succeed with probability larger than Succinv-tp + qGen0p
 `.
Zero-Knowledge. We want to construct a simulator BV;Gen;Gen0 using any verier V as a
subroutine to simulate the view from V in the protocol. One problem is that V may not
have KVs as an input by denition. So, we cannot assume that the simulator has it. B runs
the verier V and looks at the queries made by V to the oracle Gen. B puts these qGen
queries seedk for 1  k  qGen as well as the corresponding answers of Gen in memory.
The simulator then receives the rst message M of V. If this one has not a correct format,
the simulator outputs the abort view (N;KVp ; z; rV ; abort). Otherwise, the simulator checks
whether one answer among those queries seedk's made to Gen generates the challenges ui's
correctly and the image of this query by TPOW is equal to #. If it is not the case, B outputs
the abort view. Otherwise, the simulator is able to compute the right wi's from this answer
(the right ri's and ai;j 's). From the wi's, B computes seed = hGen0(w1; : : : ; w`) and checks
whether seed generates the right ri's and ai;j 's. In the positive case, B outputs the view
(N;KVp ; z; rV ; seed
). In the negative case, it outputs the abort view.
It remains to show that the two view distributions are statistically indistinguishable.
When the rst message has not a correct format, the two transcripts are clearly identical. Let
consider the case where the verier did not query any seedk which produces the challenges
ui's and whose image by TPOW leads to #. In this case, the honest prover will not abort
the protocol only if he retrieves a seed = Gen0(w1; : : : ; w`) h which generates the challenges
ui's and #. This occurs only if the verier V was able to guess that the output values of the
query seed to the oracle Gen generate the right ri's and aij 's. Since Gen is a random oracle,
no polynomial time verier V can succeed to do that with a non-negligible probability. We
still have to consider the case where the verier queried a seedk which produces the challenges
ui's and #. We see that the two transcripts are always identical, since the simulator clearly
knows the answer of the honest prover by learning the right wi's. Therefore, we can conclude
that the two transcript distributions are statistically indistinguishable.
Non-Transferability. We now want to construct an online prover simulator P which would
be undistinguishable from the real one provided that it is given the correct KVs . Based on
receiving the (u; h; #) challenge, if the format is incorrect then P aborts. Otherwise, P can
compute seed = TPOW 1(KVs ; #) then check whether u and h are well computed from seed.
If correct, P can eventually respond with seed. Clearly, the simulation is perfect. ut
The interactive coGHIproof protocol can be transformed in a 2-move protocol in a
similar way as for GHIproof . This variant called 2coGHIproof is presented below.
2coGHIproof `(S; T )
Parameters: G;H; d; p; `; k; B such that 1 < B  p and B polynomially bounded
Random oracles: Gen : f0; 1gk ! G`t  Z`std  f0; : : : ; B   1g`, Gen0 : Z`d ! f0; 1gk
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Common input: S = f(g1; e1); : : : ; (gs; es)g; T = f(x1; z1); : : : ; (xt; zt)g  GH, the
public key KVp of the verier
Witness input: f such that f(gi) = ei, i = 1; : : : ; s. We let yk = f(xk), k = 1; : : : ; t.
1: The verier picks seed 2U f0; 1gk and by applying a pseudorandom generator Gen
on this seed, generates values ri;k 2 G, ai;j;k 2 Zd, i 2 f0; 1; : : : ; B   1g for
i = 1; : : : ; `, j = 1; : : : ; s, k = 1; : : : ; t. He computes ui;k = dri;k +
Ps
j=1 ai;j;kgj +
ixk, wi;k =
Ps
j=1 ai;j;kej + izk for all i, k, and # = TPOW(K
V
p ; seed). Using a
cryptographic hash function Gen0, the verier computes h = Gen0(1; : : : ; `)seed.
Set u = (u1;1; : : : ; u`;t) and w = (w1;1; : : : ; w`;t). He sends u, w, h and # to the
prover.
2: The prover computes vi;k = f(ui;k) for i = 1; : : : ; `, k = 1; : : : ; t. From the equa-
tions wi;k   vi;k = i(zk   yk), he should be able to nd every i by exhaustive
search if the verier is honest since yk 6= zk for at least one k. The prover computes
seed0 = Gen0(1; : : : ; `) h. He checks that # = TPOW(KVp ; seed0) and that seed0
generates coecients ri;k's, ai;j;k's, i's such that ui;k = dri;k+
Ps
j=1 ai;j;kgj+ixk,
wi;k =
Ps
j=1 ai;j;kej + izk for all i and k. If not, he aborts the protocol. He then
sends seed0 to the verier.
3: The verier accepts the proof if seed0 = seed holds. Otherwise, he rejects it.
Theorem 4.25. We consider the above 2coGHIproof protocol with parameters G, H, d, p,
`, k, B. Let S be a set which interpolates in exactly one group homomorphism. We assume
that Gen and Gen0 are random oracles and that TPOW is a trapdoor one-way permutation
dened on domain f0; 1gk. 2coGHIproof is a ZK proof of membership for the language
LcoGHI(t; S). More precisely, we have the following properties.
1. Let p be the smallest prime factor of d. 2coGHIproof is sound: From any cheating
prover P limited to qGen0 queries to Gen0 who passes the protocol on T 62 LcoGHI(t; S) with
probability " we can construct an algorithm A to invert TPOW on domain f0; 1gk with
probability of success higher than "  qGen0B `.
2. 2coGHIproof is statistical black-box straight-line deniable zero-knowledge in the random
oracle model.
3. 2coGHIproof is perfect non-transferable.
Proof. This proof is very similar to the one of Th. 4.24. ut
4.6 A NIZK for MGGD
Let G, d be some parameters and S1 some input of a d-G-MGGD problem. We propose here
a non-interactive proof in which a prover proves that S1 = fg1; : : : ; gsg H-generate G, for any
group H of order d. In other words, by assertion 5 of Lemma 4.3 this corresponds to show
that hS1i+ dG = G or by assertion 6 of the same lemma that the answer to the d-G-MGGD
problem is positive. For this, the prover must be a group expert relative to (d; S1).
We rst introduce a technical result.
Lemma 4.26. Given a nite Abelian group G, a subset S1 = fg1; : : : ; gsg  G, and an
integer d with smallest prime factor p. We assume that there exists a function f : G! GZsd
satisfying
Pr
x
[x = dr + a1gs +   + asgs j x 2U G; f(x) = (r; a1; : : : as)] > 1
p
:
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Then, we have G = hS1i+ dG, i.e., S1 H-generate G for any Abelian group H of order d.
Proof. First, we notice that if gcd(#G; d) = 1, we have dG = G which trivially leads to
hS1i + dG = G. Now, assuming that gcd(#G; d) 6= 1, there exists a smallest prime p0 such
that p0j#G and p0jd. Consider now the unique prime factor decomposition #G = Qki=1 qaii ,
where q1 < q2 <    < qk. Note that p0 = q` for an integer `  k. By the structure of the
Abelian groups, we have G ' G(q1)      G(qk) where G(qi) is the qi-subgroup of G. For
i < `, since gcd(d; qi) = 1, we have dG(qi) = G(qi). This shows that the structure of dG is of
the form
dG ' G(q1)    G(q` 1) dG(q`)     dG(qk)
and that #dG =
Q` 1
i=1 q
ai
i 
Qk
i=` q
bi
i , for some integers bi's satisfying bi  ai for i = `; : : : ; k.
Since dG is a subgroup of K = hS1i+ dG, we are ensured that #K =
Q` 1
i=1 q
ai
i 
Qk
i=` q
ci
i with
bi  ci  ai for i  `. Thus, #G=#K =
Qk
i=` q
ai ci
i which is either 1 or something greater or
equal to p0. By the existence of f , we have #G=#K < p  p0 which implies that G = K. ut
We make use of a pseudorandom generator GenM modeled by a random oracle. Let ` 2 N
be a security parameter. This protocol called NIMGGDproof is depicted below.
NIMGGDproof `(S1)
Parameters: G; d
Input: `, S1 = fg1; : : : ; gsg  G
1: The prover picks seedM 2U f0; 1gkm uniformly at random and using the pseudo-
random generator GenM produces some challenges GenM(G; seedM) = (x1; : : : ; x`).
Then, using his group expertise, he nds ri 2 G and ai;1; : : : ; ai;s 2 Zd such that
xi = dri+
Ps
j=1 ai;jgj for i = 1; : : : ; `. He sends seedM and the coecients ri's and
ai;j 's to the verier.
2: Using GenM, the verier generates x1; : : : ; x` from seedM. He checks that xi =
dri +
Ps
j=1 ai;jgj holds for i = 1; : : : ; `. If this is the case, the verier accepts the
proof. Otherwise, he rejects it.
Note that the G occurrence in GenM(G; seedM) means that GenM must be fed with the
description and representation of G. This is to make sure that it was chosen before generating
the elements and avoid problems like in ECDSA [55].
Theorem 4.27. Let G be an Abelian group and d be an integer with smallest prime factor p.
We assume that GenM is a random oracle. We consider the above NIMGGDproof protocol
with parameters G, d. For provers who are group experts relative to (d; S1),NIMGGDproof(S1)
is a NIZK for the language LMGGD(d;G). More precisely, we have the following properties.
1. NIMGGDproof is sound: for any set S1 such that hS1i+ dG 6= G, any cheating prover
P limited to qGenM queries to GenM, has a success probability
Succsd-NIMGGDP  qGenM  p ` + (#G) `:
2. NIMGGDproof is perfect non-interactive black-box zero-knowledge in the random oracle
model.
Proof. Completeness is trivial.
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Soundness. We describe here a simulator B who uses P in order to win the following game.
Without loss of generality, we assume that P does not submit the same query more than
once.
Game: A challenger picks xi 2U G uniformly at random for i = 1; : : : ; ` and sends
x1; : : : ; x` to B. The simulator wins if he is able to nd coecients ri's and ai;j 's such
that xi = dri +
Ps
j=1 ai;jgj for i = 1; : : : ; `.
The simulator rst receives x = (x1; : : : ; x`) according to the above game and runs P.
B picks an integer n 2U f1; : : : ; qGenMg uniformly at random. The GenM queries made by P
are simulated by maintaining a list of the queries and corresponding answers. Upon queries,
the simulator outputs a uniformly random answer and adds the new pair in the list. However,
we handle the nth query in a special way. Namely, we answer x to this query. Since x was
picked uniformly at random, B simulates the oracle GenM perfectly. At the end, P outputs
a seed seedM and coecients ri's and ai;j 's. The simulator forwards the same coecients to
his challenger.
Let A be the event \B wins the game". By Lemma 4.26, Pr[A]  p `. We also note that
event A occurs only if P sends seedM as nth query made to GenM. Let B be the event \P
queried seedM to GenM" and C be the event \P succeeds". We have
Pr[A] =
1
qGenM
 Pr[B ^ C]:
Since GenM is a random oracle, Pr[:B ^ C]  (#G) `, because the prover needs to guess x
which corresponds to some seedM. Putting all together leads to
p `  Pr[A]  1
qGenM

Succsd-NIMGGDP   (#G) `

;
which concludes the proof.
Non-interactive zero-knowledge. We describe a simulator B who simulates the message sent by
an honest prover. Although the verier V does not send any message here, the simulator needs
to simulate the random oracle GenM which can be queried by V. B picks ri 2U G, ai;j 2U Zd
and computes xi = dri +
Ps
j=1 ai;jgj , for i = 1; : : : ; `, j = 1; : : : ; s. The simulator picks
seedM 2U f0; 1gkm uniformly at random and adds the pair (seedM; x), where x = (x1; : : : ; x`)
in a list maintained to simulate GenM. Then, the simulator can run V and sends him seedM
and the coecients ri's, ai;j 's. B simulates GenM as usual by maintaining a list of the previous
queries and corresponding answers. For any new query, the simulator simply picks the answer
uniformly at random. The simulation is done perfectly since seedM was added in the list
before the rst query made by V. ut
4.7 A 0-Move Proof for MGGD
We can further reduce the proof by making sure that almost all instances belong to the
language. A rst idea consists in including the NIZK in the instance so that instances become
self-proven. Another idea can be used in order to relax the group expert assumption which is
needed in the NIMGGDproof protocol. For this, we provide a proof that the instance was
randomly generated. The instance is generated by
GenK(G; seedK) = (g1; : : : ; gs):
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The value seedK is added in the instance as a proof and actually replaces it as the instance is
fully dened by seedK. We essentially use two dierent approaches. The rst one consists of
having instances long enough so that it is hard to generate a bad instance oine. The second
one consists of having a TTP to select the random seed and an instance so that it is hard
to generate a bad instance online. The latter approach requires using a certicate for proper
generation of the seed.
We start by the following technical lemma.
Lemma 4.28. Let A be a nite Abelian p-group such that A ' Zpe1  Zpe2      Zpek , for
some integers 0 < e1  e2      ek. Set e =
Pk
i=1 ei. The number of maximal subgroups of
A, i.e., of order pe 1 is equal to (pk   1)=(p  1).
Proof. According to some results in combinatorial theory (see [38, p. 87] quoted in Butler [13]),
the number of subgroups of A of order p` is equal to those of order pe `, for any integer ` < e.
Hence, our problem can be solved by enumerating all subgroups of A of order p. For this,
we consider all elements of A of order p. Since any group Zpei contains exactly p elements
of order p or which are 0 for i = 1; : : : ; k, we have pk   1 elements in A of order p (we just
need to remove the neutral element). To conclude, it suces to remark that any subgroup
generated by an element of order p is in fact generated by p  1 such elements. ut
Theorem 4.29. Let G, H be some Abelian groups, and d the order of H. The probability
Pgen that some elements g1; : : : ; gs 2U G picked uniformly at random H-generate G satises
Pgen 
Y
q2Pd

1  q
kq   1
(q   1)  qs

;
where Pd is the set of all prime factors of gcd(#G; d) and kq is the rank of the maximal
q-subgroup of G: Given a prime q, the q-subgroup of G is the subgroup Aq of elements whose
order are powers of q. The rank kq is the integer such that there exists a unique sequence of
integers aq;1      aq;kq such that Aq is isomorphic to Zqaq;1      Zqaq;kq .
Proof. By the assertion 6 of Lemma 4.3, we need to study the probability to generate the
quotient group G=(d  G) with some elements picked uniformly at random. Classical results
on the structure of Abelian groups states the decomposition G ' Ap1     Apn . Note that
G=(d G) ' Ap1=dAp1     Apn=dApn :
We consider Bq = Aq=dAq and study the probability that elements generate this group. If
gcd(d; q) = 1, then dAq = Aq and Bq is trivial. So, we only focus on the q's that divide d and
denote eq the largest integer such that q
eq jd. We deduce that the structure of Bq satises
Bq ' Zqaq;1      Zqaq;r  Zqeq      Zqeq ;
where r is the largest integer such that aq;r < eq. The probability Pq that s elements does
not generate Bq is equal to the probability that these elements stay in one of the maximal
subgroups of Bq. By Lemma 4.28, the number of such subgroups is equal to (q
kq   1)=(q  1).
Therefore,
Pq  q
kq   1
(q   1)  qs :
Since these events are independent for the dierent Bq's, the nal probability is obtained by
multiplying the terms 1  Pq. ut
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Remark 4.30. As an application, if d is prime and if the d-subgroup of G is a product of k
cyclic groups, we have Pgen  1   (dk   1)=(d   1)  d s. In practice, we will rarely have k
greater than 2 so that we approximately have a probability of 1  d s+1.
5 MOVA Scheme
5.1 Description
We present our scheme called MOVA which is based on a secret group homomorphism. This
scheme was rst proposed at ASIACRYPT '04 [43] and was inspired by a preliminary version
restricted to group characters (with a less ecient denial protocol) presented at PKC '04 [44].
Since MOVA is generic, the precise setup algorithms are not specied. In addition to this,
several variants are proposed depending on whether key registration is used and on whether a
group expertise can be used. Depending on the situation one will be preferred on the others.
Concrete instances are discussed in Section 5.3.
Domain Parameters. To formally comply with asymptotic denitions of security proper-
ties, the above parameters can be seen as polynomial functions of one single global security
parameter k. We let integers Lkey, Lsig, Icon, Iden be polynomial security parameters as
well as \group ensembles" for Xgroup and Ygroup. The group ensembles should dene
groups, representation of elements with polynomial length, and polynomial-time addition,
inversion, and comparison algorithms. An optional parameter Ival 2 N is used for variant
using NIMGGDproof .
Primitives. We use two deterministic pseudorandom generators GenK and GenS (modeled
by some random oracles) which produce elements of Xgroup. We consider a trapdoor one-
way permutation TPOW. The associated pair of key (KVp ;KVs ) is that of the verier. We
also use additional random oracles specied in protocols given in Section 4.
Secret Key. KSs = Hom is a group homomorphism from Xgroup to Ygroup.
Public Key. KSp = (Xgroup;Ygroup; seedK; (Ykey1; : : : ;YkeyLkey); opt) where opt is an op-
tional string which can be used to check the KSp validity in the setup variants. We
always implicitly assume that the participants check this string before using a public
key. We use (Xkey1; : : : ;XkeyLkey) = GenK(Xgroup; seedK) and Ykeyj = Hom(Xkeyj) for
j = 1; : : : ; Lkey.
Validate. The rst two options consist of using the 0MGGDproof verication algorithm.
Either it is based on a long key (so the public key only includes a seed) or it is based on a
TTP-certied seed (in which case the public key also includes a certicate for the seed). A
third option consists of verifying the NIZK as specied in the NIMGGDproof Ival protocol
which must be included in the public key.
Signature Generation. Let m be a message to sign. The signer generates
GenS(m) =
 
Xsig1; : : : ;XsigLsig

:
He then computes Ysigk = Hom(Xsigk) for k = 1; : : : ; Lsig. The signature is
 = (Ysig1; : : : ;YsigLsig):
It is Lsig  log2 d bits long.
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Conrmation Protocol. Let (m;) be a supposedly valid message-signature pair. The ver-
ier rst checks that the public key is valid using Validate. Both the signer and the verier
(signature's recipient) compute the elements Xkey1; : : : ;XkeyLkey from the signer's public
key. They also generate GenS(m) = (Xsig1; : : : ;XsigLsig). The signer playing the role of the
prover runs 2GHIproof Icon with the verier on the set
N = f(Xkeyj ;Ykeyj) j j = 1; : : : ; Lkeyg [ f(Xsigk;Ysigk) j k = 1; : : : ; Lsigg:
Denial Protocol. Let (m;0) be an alleged invalid message-signature pair. We denote 0 =
(Zsig1; : : : ;ZsigLsig). The verier rst checks that the public key is valid. The signer
and the verier compute Xkey1; : : : ;XkeyLkey from the public key as well as GenS(m) !
Xsig1; : : : ;XsigLsig. The signer playing the role of the prover run 2coGHIproof Iden with
the verier on the sets
S = f(Xkeyj ;Ykeyj) j j = 1; : : : ; Lkeyg and T = f(Xsigk;Zsigk) j k = 1; : : : ; Lsigg:
The protocol options are 3-fold. First, we can choose the 4-Move or the 2-Move option for
the GHI or coGHI proofs. One dierence is that the 2-Move option requires random oracles
instead of a trapdoor commitment. In addition to this, the 4-Move option requires a group
expert algorithm to exist (although it shall not necessarily be known by the signer). Since the
signature itself requires random oracles we found no advantage in using the 4-Move option
so we concentrate on the 2-Move one. Second, we can choose to have non-transferability (in
which case we need keys for the verier) or not. If non-transferability is not a concern we can
get rid of the key pair for the verier and no longer use a trapdoor one-way permutation.
Finally, there are 3 options for the validate algorithm. We can use the 0MGGDproof using
either a long key or a TTP-certied seed. Another choice, when group experts exist, consists
of expanding the public key with a NIZK (the NIMGGDproof protocol). The selection of the
NT versus non-NT and the Validate option span into 6 possible settings:
option 0MGGDproof 0MGGDproof NIMGGDproof comment
non-NT    no key for V
NT    uses TPOW
comment Lkey long TTP group expert
5.2 Security Results
We rst prove that the 2-move version of the MOVA scheme satises the security properties of
undeniable signature schemes. The proofs of resistance against forgery attacks and invisibility
were inspired from Kurosawa and Heng [34].
Theorem 5.1. Let e denote the natural logarithm base. The MOVA scheme satises the
following security properties in the random oracle model.
1. Conrm and Deny are non-transferable zero-knowledge proof of membership.
2. Consider the Lsig-S-GHI problem with the same parameters as for the MOVA scheme,
i.e., G = Xgroup, H = Ygroup and the set S = f(Xkey1;Ykey1); : : : ; (XkeyLkey;YkeyLkey)g.
Assume that for any algorithm B with a given complexity, we have SuccLsig-S-GHIB  ".
Then, any forger F with similar complexity using qS signing queries and qV queries to
the conrmation/denial oracle wins the forgery game under a chosen-message attack with
probability at most "e(1 + qS)(1 + qV ).
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3. Consider the Lsig-S-GHID problem with the same parameters. Assume that for any algo-
rithm B and B0 with a given complexity, we have
AdvLsig-S-GHIDB  " and SuccLsig-S-GHIB0  "0:
Then, any distinguisher D with similar complexity using qS signing queries and qV queries
to the conrmation/denial oracle wins the invisibility game under a chosen-message attack
with advantage
Advinv-cmaD  e(1 + qS)("+ 2(1 + qV )"0):
Proof. The properties of Conrm and Deny come from Theorems in Sections 4.4{4.5.
Unforgeability. Let F be a forger who succeeds to existentially forge a signature under an
adaptive chosen-message attack with probability "0. We construct an algorithm B using the
forger F and KVs . At the beginning, B receives the challenges x1; : : : ; xLsig 2 Xgroup of the
Lsig-S-GHI problem. Then, B runs the forger and simulates the queries to the random oracle
GenS, qS queries to the signing oracle Sign and qV queries to the denial/conrmation oracle
Ver. We can assume that all messages sent to Sign resp. Ver were previously queried to GenS
(since the oracle Sign resp. Ver has to make such queries anyway). B simulates the oracles
GenS and Sign as follows:
GenS. B maintains a list of the messages queried to GenS and corresponding answer. If the
message was already queried, B outputs the corresponding answer in the list. Otherwise,
he picks ai;j 2U Zd and ri 2U Xgroup uniformly at random for 1  i  Lsig, 1  j  Lkey.
With probability q, he answers Xsigi = dri+
PLkey
j=1 ai;jXkeyj for i = 1; : : : ; Lsig. We call it
type-1 answer. With probability 1  q, the answer is Xsigi = dri+xi+
PLkey
j=1 ai;jXkeyj for
i = 1; : : : ; Lsig. We call it type-2 answer. For each message, B keeps the coecients ai;j 's
and ri's and answer type in memory. Note that the simulation is perfect by Lemma 4.16,
since the public key is valid.
Sign. For a message m, if the answer to the GenS query of m was of type-1, then B answers
Ysigi =
PLkey
j=1 ai;jYkeyj for i = 1; : : : ; Lsig. Otherwise, it aborts the simulation.
Let (mi; i) denote the ith query to Ver for 1  i  qV and (mqV +1; qV +1) denote the F
output. In order to simulate the answers of the queries made to Ver, B guesses the smallest
i such that (mi; i) is a valid forged pair (i.e., m was not queried to Sign). To this, B simply
picks ` uniformly at random in f1; : : : qV + 1g. B deals with the ith query as follows:
i < `. To any query (mi; i), B checks whether mi was submitted to Sign. If it is the case, B is
able to decide whether (mi; i) is valid and simulates the appropriate protocol. Otherwise,
B guesses that (mi; i) is invalid and simulates the appropriate protocol. The simulation is
done as the simulator in the proof of non-transferability of the conrmation (resp. denial)
protocol.
i = `. Let (m`; `) = (m`;Ysig1; : : : ;YsigLsig). If the corresponding Xsigi's were of type-1, B
aborts. Otherwise, when ` was correctly guessed Ysigi = yi+
PLkey
j=1 ai;jYkeyj and B is able
to deduce the yi's of the Lsig-S-GHI problem.
It remains to compute the probability that B retrieves the yi's and did not abort. This
event occurs if B is able to simulate all Sign queries, guess the right ` and use the mes-
sage m` to deduce the yi's. Therefore, Pr[B succeedsjF succeeds] = qqS (1   q)=(qV + 1). As
for the full-domain hash technique [19] and as in [34], the optimal qopt = qS=(qS + 1) so
Pr[BsucceedsjF succeeds]  1e(1+qS)(1+qV ) . Thus, "0  "e(1 + qS)(1 + qV ).
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Invisibility. Let D be a distinguisher which breaks the invisibility of the MOVA scheme with
an advantage ". We construct an algorithm B which solves the Lsig-S-GHID problem by
using D and KVs . At the beginning, B is challenged with a tuple f(x1; y1); : : : ; (xLsig; yLsig)g 2
(XgroupYgroup)Lsig for which it has to decide whether Hom(xi) = yi for all 1  i  Lsig or if
this tuple was picked at random. Like for the proof of the existential forgery, the simulator B
runs D and simulates the queries to the random oracle GenS, qS queries to the signing oracle
Sign and the queries to the denial/conrmation oracle Ver. We can assume that each message
queried to Sign or Ver was previously queried to the random oracle GenS. We assume that
no query m to Ver was submitted to Sign beforehand. (Otherwise, we can just simulate them
with KVs .) Let Forge be the event in which D sends a valid message-signature pair to Ver. We
rst remove all instances for which the event Forge occurs. So, we can now assume that D
never submits any valid pair (m;) to Ver such that m was not previously submitted to Sign.
B simulates the oracles just like in the proof of unforgeability with ` = qV + 1 (we excluded
valid forged pairs).
After a given time, the distinguisher D sends a message m to the challenger of the
invisibility game which is simulated by B. We can assume that m was queried to GenS
(otherwise B simulates a new query). If the answer of m to GenS was of type-1, B aborts
the simulation. Otherwise, it sends the challenge signature (Ysig1; : : : ;Ysig

Lsig) where Ysig

i =
yi +
PLkey
j=1 ai;jYkeyj for 1  i  Lsig. Then, D continues to query the oracles which are
simulated by B as above.
Finally, D outputs a guess bit b0. The simulator B outputs the same bit b0 as guess bit to
the Lsig-S-GHID challenger or a random bit when B aborted.
Using the homomorphic property of Hom, we deduce that the set f(xi; yi)gLsigi=1 interpolates
in a group homomorphism with the set of points S if and only if (m;Ysig1; : : : ;Ysig

Lsig) is
a valid message-signature pair. Hence, when the simulator does not abort and the event
Forge does not occur, B perfectly simulates the invisibility games. It remains to compute the
advantage of B.
For a bit b, we denote Ab the probability event that B does not abort when the challenge
to B was of the form Tb (thus, B simulates the game Gameinv-cma-b to D). Note that the
probability Pr[A1] = Pr[A0] can be bounded in an optimal way as in the proof of existential
forgery attacks, namely, by choosing q adequately we get Pr[A1]  (1=e(1 + qS)). We now
dene the events Bb and Db which occur when B and D respectively outputs the bit 0 when
the challenge was of the form Tb. Note that if Ab happens, both events Bb and Db occurs
simultaneously. Let us denote "0 resp. "1, the probability for D to output 0 in the game
Gameinv-cma-0 resp. Gameinv-cma-1. We now estimate Pr[B0jA0] and Pr[B1jA1] with respect
to "0 and "1. To this end, we notice that the event B0jA0 resp. B1jA1 occurs simultaneously
with the event where D outputs 0 in the game Gameinv-cma-0 resp. Gameinv-cma-1, provided
that the event Forge does not occur. Hence, applying the dierence lemma of Shoup [54] leads
to
jPr[BbjAb]  "bj  Pr[Forge]
for b = 0; 1. From this, we can deduce that Pr[B0jA0]  "0   Pr[Forge] and Pr[B1jA1] 
"1+Pr[Forge]. Without loss of generality, we can assume that Pr[B0]  Pr[B1]. The advantage
of B is then equal to
Pr[B0]  Pr[B1] = Pr[:A0]  (Pr[B0j:A0]  Pr[B1j:A1])
+ Pr[A0]  (Pr[B0jA0]  Pr[B1jA1]):
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Since Pr[B0j:A0] = Pr[B1j:A1] = 1=2 and "0   "1 = Advinv cmaD , we nally have
AdvLsig-S-GHIDB 
1
(1 + qS)e

Advinv cmaD   2Pr[Forge]

:
We can conclude by noting that Forge occurs with a probability bounded by e(1+qS)(1+qV )"
0
by assertion 2. ut
Remark 5.2. Similarly to Laguillaumie and Vergnaud [35], the eciency of the security re-
duction for the existential forgery can be improved (factor (1+qV )
 1 is removed) by replacing
the GHI problem by its gap variant [47]. This problem consists in solving the GHI problem
using an access to an oracle which solves the corresponding GHID problem. This one helps to
simulate the conrmation and denial oracles. So, we do not need to guess ` 2 f1; : : : ; qV + 1g
to simulate these oracles correctly.
Remark 5.3. MOVA scheme can be made probabilistic so that the invisibility notion dened
in Galbraith and Mao [23] is satised. To this, it suces to append some randomness r to the
message to sign and to add r in the signature. The drawback is that the signature enlarges.
5.3 Parameters, Implementation, and other Properties
Security results on the unforgeability and the invisibility of MOVA given in Theorem 5.1 allow
to directly derive some bounds on the signature size provided certain assumptions on the GHI
and GHID problems. We point out that the hardness of solving GHI and GHID problems can
often be scaled by only adjusting the size of Xgroup.
To illustrate this, consider Xgroup = Zn with n = pq for two large primes p, q and the
Legendre symbol (=p). Solving the corresponding GHI problem requires to solve the quadratic
residuosity assumption for which the best known solver algorithm consists in factoring n.
As shown by the above example, the MOVA scheme can be instantiated such that the
signature size is fully scalable depending on the required security. In certain cases, we can
also select Xgroup such that the hardness of GHI is adjusted to the computational power of
the adversary without any impact on the signature size. Namely, we assume here that Xgroup
is adjusted such that
SuccLsig-S-GHIB  d Lsig and AdvLsig-S-GHIDB  0;
for all algorithms B with similar complexity as the adversary. Using Theorem 5.1, this leads
to
Succef-cmaF  eqSqV d Lsig and Advinv-cmaD  2eqSqV d Lsig:
Since the verication of an undeniable signature must be done online, we can consider some
security probabilities of about 2 20 instead of the classical oine security of 2 80. In Table 1,
we give the required MOVA signature size in order to achieve Succef-cmaF  2 20 depending on
qS and qV . We can get the same (except 1 bit due to the factor 2) results for the invisibility.
As an example, an application involving qS = 2
10 signatures and up to qV = 2
20 online
verications per key can tolerate a size of Lsig = 52 bits.
Results for the soundness of the 2-move conrmation and denial protocols can be obtained
using Theorem 4.24 and 4.25. Under the assumption Succinv-tp  0, we obtain
Succsd-conS  qGen0p Icon and Succsd-denS  qGen0p Iden:
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qS qV Lsig  log2(d) bits
210 210 42
210 220 52
220 210 52
220 220 62
Table 1. Signature size with unforgeability and invisibility of 2 20
For instance, we can achieve a soundness probability of 2 20 with the parameters Icon =
Iden = 60= log2(p), qGen0 = 2
40. Similarly, for the 4-move protocols, we assume that Commit
satises
Succcom-bndB  0
for any algorithm B with similar complexity as the adversary. This shows that
Succsd-conS  p Icon and Succsd-denS  p Iden;
which leads to some smaller parameters Icon and Iden. Namely, for a soundness probability
of 2 20, we get Icon = Iden = 20= log2(p).
We examine here the size of parameters implied by the dierent setup variants accord-
ing to their specicity. First, we note that security of Setup Variant using 0-Move proof for
MGGD is directly deduced from the results of Theorem 4.29. The main dierence is simply
due to the number of attempts the adversary can perform until he gets some \bad" ele-
ments Xkey1; : : : ;XkeyLkey. In the rst variant, the signer can try as many attempts as he
can so that we require an \oine" probability Pgen  1   2 80, while in the second one he
is very limited so that we require an \online" probability Pgen  1   2 20. Assuming sim-
ilar assumptions as in Remark 4.30, we get Lkey = 81= log2(d) for 0-Move with long key
variant and Lkey = 21= log2(d) for 0-Move with TTP variant. This means that the tuple
(Ykey1; : : : ;YkeyLkey) which is contained in the public key would be 81 and 21 bits long re-
spectively. As for the soundness of the conrmation and denial protocols, we get a probability
that the signer passes the protocol with an invalid public key of 2 20 with Ival = 20= log2(p)
assuming that no ecient adversary breaks the computationally binding property of Commit.
Finally, Theorem 4.27 gives results for Setup variant with NIZK for MGGD. Since Xgroup is
usually greater than p, we have
Succsd-NIMGGDP  qGenM  p Ival;
which leads to a probability of 2 20 with qGenM = 260 and Ival = 80= log2(p).
5.4 Potential Instantiations
We briey discuss some potential instantiations of the homomorphism which allow to consider
short signatures. These ones must have a short group range.
Characters. Let n = pq be an RSA modulus. A character on Zn is a homomorphism from Zn
to Cnf0g. We consider some characters  of order d = 2; 3; 4, i.e., d(x) = 1 for any x 2 Zn.
For d = 2, the non-trivial characters which are assumed hard to compute are both Legendre
(Jacobi) symbols (=p) and (=q). For d = 3 or 4, the characters correspond to some natural
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generalization of the Legendre symbols arising in the theory of cubic and quartic residuosity
respectively. The cubic characters require the use of Eisenstein integers, i.e., elements of the
form a + b! for a; b 2 Z and ! = ( 1 + p 3)=2. We require that p  q  1 (mod 3) and
take an Eisenstein integer  such that  = p. As candidate homomorphism we can take 
dened by (x) = x
(p 1)=3 (mod ) for x 2 Zn. Similarly, characters of order 4 arises in the
set of Gauss integers Z[i] = fa + bija; b 2 Zg. Choose p  q  1 (mod 4) and  such that
 = p. Then, consider  dened as (x) = x
(p 1)=4 (mod ) for x 2 Zn.
The cubic and quartic characters can be eciently (about quadratic time) computed using
reciprocity laws as for the quadratic residue. We also note that group expertise for the above
characters correspond to the factorization of n. A more detailed treatment on the character
instantiations can be found in [41,44].
Example 5.4 (QR parameters). As a concrete example we propose to adopt the Legendre
symbol Hom(x) = (x=p) and use Lkey = 21, Lsig = 52, Icon = Iden = 60, Ival = 80, and the
2-Move variant with NIMGGDproof . Under the assumption that qS < 10
3, qV < 10
6, and
qGen0 < 10
12 we have an online security of 220 and an oine security of 280.
Example 5.5 (Newton parameters). Let n be such that n = pq with p = rd + 1, q, d prime,
gcd(q   1; d) = 1, gcd(r; d) = 1 and g generating a subgroup of Zp. We obtain g by choosing
a random element h 2 Zn until h satises hr mod p 6= 1 and we set g = hr mod p. Like this
we nd a homomorphism by \sending" the input in a hidden cyclic subgroup of order d and
then computing its discrete logarithm with respect to the generator g,
' : Zn  ! Zd
x 7 ! logg(xr mod p):
The expert group knowledge is obtained if one knows p and q. Typically, we could use d =
220   3 = 1 048 573 which is prime, Lkey = 1, Lsig = 3, Icon = Iden = 3, Ival = 4, and the
2-Move variant with NIMGGDproof . Under the assumption that qS < 10
3, qV < 10
6, and
qGen0 < 10
12 we have an online security of 220 and an oine security of 280.
5.5 Implementation of the Signature Generation
Here, we nally compare the time required for generating a MOVA signature with dierent
homomorphisms. We consider a signature size of Lsig = 20 bits (except for RSA). We omit the
time required by the generation of the values Xsigi's. Hence, we compare the time required for
computing 20 Jacobi symbols (=p)2, 10 quartic residue symbols , 1 homomorphism based
on the discrete logarithm in a hidden subgroup and 1 RSA homomorphism. We recall that
for all these homomorphisms, we take a modulus n of size of 1024 bits.
The implementation of all algorithms has been written in C using the GNU Multiple
Precision Arithmetic Library (GMP) [26] and was done by Yvonne Anne Oswald in 2005 [48].
The tests have been done on an Intel(R)4 1.4 GHz Desktop Computer with 256 MB RAM.
Results are given in Table 2. To scale these numbers with Lsig = 52 the gures for symbols
should be multiplied by 5220 , the ones for baby-step/giant-step and pollard discrete logarithm
should be multiplied by
q
52
20 , the one for RSA should be kept as is (the signature is not short),
and we should not consider precomputed tables for discrete logarithm any more. Results are
also reported.
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Lsig = 20 Lsig = 52
Homomorphism time in ms time in ms
Quartic Residue Symbol () 90.32 234.83
Jacobi Symbol (ordinary algorithm) 25.22 65.57
Jacobi Symbol (mpz jacobi) 2.32 6.03
Discrete Logarithm (Precomputed Table) 9.66 n/a
Discrete Logarithm (Baby-Step Giant-Step) 19.47 31.39
Discrete Logarithm (Pollard's rho) 74.93 120.82
RSA 33.87 33.87
Table 2. Signature Generation
We have implemented the Jacobi symbol using basic GMP subroutines in order to have
a fair comparison with our implementation of the quartic residue symbol. We note that the
highly optimized GMP implementation of the Jacobi symbol mpz jacobi provides the fastest
signature generation and that the quartic residue symbol  is about 4 times slower than our
implementation of the Jacobi symbol. This is mainly due to the fact that all operations are
performed in Z[i] instead of Z. Due to the nature of Eisenstein integers, a similar result for
cubic characters is very likely. The variants of the discrete logarithm oer a very competi-
tive homomorphism. In particular, except for the variant using the Pollard rho method this
homomorphism is more ecient than an RSA ordinary signature. In particular, the variant
with the precomputed table is three times faster than an RSA signature.
Note that these results directly apply to the conrmation protocol since the number of
homomorphism evaluations the prover needs to perform is proportional (except for RSA which
does not provide small signature) to that required for the signature generation.
More details about the optimization of the above homomorphisms are given in [42].
5.6 Other Properties
We point out that our scheme allows a batch verication of signatures. Indeed, the conrma-
tion protocol can be easily adapted in order to conrm several signatures at the same time by
putting all (Xsigk;Ysigk) in a single set S. The properties of the 2GHIproof protocol are such
that the communication complexity remains the same whereas the computation complexity
is linear in the number of the signatures. To isolate a small set of m incorrect signatures in
a big set of n signatures we can use a cut-and-choose algorithm and do it with O(m log n)
iterations.
Note that the signer with group expertise can selectively convert an undeniable signature
into a classical one by nding the coecients ai;k 2 Zd and ri 2 Xgroup such that
Xsigi = dri +
LkeyX
k=1
ai;kXkeyk for i = 1; : : : ; Lsig:
The conversion consists of revealing these coecients. For verifying a signature, it suces to
check the above equations and verify that Ysigi =
PLkey
k=1 ai;kYkeyk for i = 1; : : : ; Lsig.
There are some cases where computing the group homomorphism does not imply group
expertise but some group expertise may exist. For instance, take p  q  1 (mod 4) and
 2 Z[i] such that  = n. The quartic residue symbol (x) can be evaluated using  and
x only. It provides a single hard-to-compute bit since ((x))
2 = (x=n) is the Jacobi symbol
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which is easy to compute from x and n only. Here, the value of  does not leak the factors of
n so the 4-G-Root problem remains hard. We can thus obtain two levels of secrets: a rst level
which is enough to compute signatures and participate to verication protocols, and another
level which can convert signatures and make NIZK proofs for public keys.
6 Conclusion
We have proposed a generic scheme called MOVA based on group homomorphisms which gen-
eralizes the Chaum's undeniable signature scheme. For this, we developed a general framework
based on the interpolation of group homomorphisms. Several well-known problems such as
Die-Hellman and discrete logarithm can be easily expressed in this setting. By considering
group homomorphisms with a small range group and scaling the domain group with respect to
the adversary's complexity, we can naturally achieve very short signatures. As far as we know,
this is the rst signature scheme for which signatures of less than 80 bits can be considered.
As further results, our 2-move conrmation and denial protocols reach the minimal number of
moves for interactive verication protocols. Possible concrete instantiations of MOVA scheme
have been studied and implementations showed that Legendre symbol oers the most ecient
signature generation.
As open issues for further research, we are wondering if the interpolation of group ho-
momorphisms can contribute to the design of other cryptographic primitives or give new
theoretical insights in public-key cryptography. We also point out that designing a similar
scheme (with short signatures) without using random oracles is still an open problem.
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